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PROTEST IS DIFFERENT
Jessica L. West *
INTRODUCTION
Sometimes dramatic, sometimes mundane, acts of civil disobe-
dience bring attention to issues that have recently included cli-
mate change, policing, and high school closings.1 In the United
States, we are surrounded by protest. The stories of these pro-
tests capture deep aspects of the human experience and our rela-
tionship to government power.' These stories often involve a con-
frontation between the protester and the law. Popular media is
full of stories of protesters who have stepped over the law: the
news article regarding a nun who served seven years in federal
prison for pouring a vial of human blood on a Trident missile silo;3
the movie about an environmental protester who broke up a fed-
* Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. This article is dedicated to mem-
bers of the generations on either side of me: my parents and my children. Vocal anti-war
and civil rights activists, my parents' activities etched into my young mind the power of
protest. My children, Anaya West and Chloe West, themselves activists with a strong
sense of justice, give me hope for the future.
1. See, e.g., Sarah Berger, Ferguson Protests Arrests: Cornel West, DeRay McKesson,
Johnetta Elzie and Osagyefo Sekou Arrested In St. Louis, INT'L Bus. TIMES *Aug. 10, 2015,
4:29 PM), http://www.ibtimes.comferguson-protests-arrests-cornelwest-deray-mckesson-
johnetta-elzie-osagyefo-sekou-2047082; Hal Burton, Shell Icebreaker Moves Out as Protest-
ers in Portland Dangle From Bridge to Block It, SEATTLE TIMES (July 30, 2015, 7:27 AM),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/protesters-in-portland-rappel-off-
bridge-to-block-shell-icebreaker; Lauren Fitzpatrick, Dyett High School Supporters Arrest-
ed After City Hall Sit-In, CHI. SUN-TIMES (July 29, 2015, 11:02 AM), http://chicago.sun
times.com/news/7/71/833430/dyett-high-school-supporters-arrested-city-hall-sit-in.
2. See Andy Merrifield, The Enigma of Revolt: Militant Politics in a Post-Political
Age, in THE POST-POLITICAL AND ITS DISCONTENTS: SPACES OF DEPOLITICISATION,
SPECTRES OF RADICAL POLITICS 279, 290 (Japhy Wilson & Eric Swyngedouw eds., 2014)
("Perhaps it's possible to draw up a list of 'archetypes of dissent' .. that symbolise. . .
some innate disposition to make trouble, to dissent and protest, to revolt against the struc-
tures of modern power- .. ").
3. See Linda Stasi, EXCLUSIVE: 84-Year-Old Activist Nun Imprisoned in Brooklyn
Jail Hellhole for Breaking into Nuclear Facility, Exposing Security Flaws, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Jan. 19, 2015, 2:30 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/exclusive-
nun-84-brooklyn-j ail-helthole-activism-article- 1.2083481.
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eral lease auction;4 the business journal report on the $20 million
cost to the city of Baltimore for the police overtime and cleanup as
a result of protestss
The stories of protest weave a complex picture of its place in a
society built on the rule of law. Usually without express acknowl-
edgment, popular references highlight a fundamental democratic
tension underlying each act of civil disobedience. Often, our cul-
tural references embody recognition of the right to assemble,
speak, and protest, and an acknowledgement of the protesters'
underlying grievances. This sense of the "right" of protest com-
petes with the similarly recognized importance of the primacy of
the law and obedience to it. These different strands of public dis-
course epitomize this tension. On the one hand, popular senti-
ment is expressed through the sense that obedience to an unjust
law is no virtue.6 In this view, speech and dissent are fundamen-
tal principles, and protest is an embodiment of these values. On
the other hand, some discourse emphasizes the economic costs of
protest-the cost of police, the loss of business-while legal schol-
ars and jurists tend to emphasize the social and legal disruption
caused by protest.7
4. See About the Film, BIDDER 70, http://www.bidder70film.com#!about/cee5 (last
visited Dec. 1, 2015).
5. Yvonne Wenger, Unrest Will Cost City $20 Million, Officials Estimate, BALTIMORE
SUN (May 26, 2015, 7:11 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/marylandbaltimore-city
/bs-md-ci-unrest-cost-20150526-story.html.
6. "One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely,
one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws." Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter
from a Birmingham Jail, Apr. 16, 1963. "An unjust law is itself a species of violence. Ar-
rest for its breach is more so. Now the law of nonviolence says that violence should be re-
sisted not by counter-violence but by nonviolence .... This I do, by breaking the law and
by peacefully submitting to arrest and imprisonment." Mohandas Gandhi, NON-VIOLENCE
IN PEACE AND WAR 1942-49 (1962). "Protest beyond the law is not a departure from de-
mocracy; it is absolutely essential to it." HOWARD ZINN, THE ZINN READER: WRITINGS ON
DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY 383 (1997). "[I1f [the machine of government] is of such a
nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the
law." Henry David Thoreau, ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 142-43 (Wendell Glick ed. 1982)
(1849). "[Ain unjust law is no law at all." Saint Augustine, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL 8
(Thomas Williams trans. 1993).
7. See, e.g., Charges Filed Against MOA Protesters, KARE 11 (Jan. 14, 2015, 11:22
PM), http://www.kare 1 .com/story/news/crime/2015/01/14/charges-filed-against-moa-prote
sters-black-lives-matter/21752595/ (reporting that, in a case involving a protest at the
Mall of America, the Deputy Chief of Police noted for the news station that "the protest
has resulted in police overtime costs that now exceed $25,000 to taxpayers" and that the
mall "has incurred more than $8,000 in security costs").
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When a protest, even a non-violent protest, results in violation
of a criminal prohibition, it exacerbates the strain. The competi-
tion between acquiescence to the law and opposition to the law
creates, in trials of criminally disobedient protesters, a deep ten-
sion of values. Prosecutors and courts may expressly acknowledge
the costs not only of the individual act of protest, but of protest
and disobedience in general and the risks it poses to the legal and
political systems. In the midst of this, questions arise regarding
the extent protesters should be held criminally liable and pun-
ished for their actions. Among these questions are: whether pro-
testers should be criminally liable? Does a protester's sense of the
correctness of their action translate to a lack of remorse and thus
justify a harsher sentence than that of a remorseful non-protester
defendant? Should a protester's motivation to act in what they be-
lieved to be the public interest mitigate their culpability?
The tensions between protest and obedience are not easily re-
solved. How one evaluates the actions of a civilly disobedient pro-
tester will likely depend not only on how one evaluates the indi-
vidual act but also upon how one views protest, the right of
protest, the individual protester's motivations, and the overall
costs of the protest action. Ultimately, the culpability of a pro-
tester may depend not only on the individual's actions, but also
on the value the prosecutor, judge, or jury ascribes to protest and
competing interests.' The determination of the justice or injustice
of a protester's action thus requires inquiry into, and a balancing
of, many factors. Important in the weighing might be individual
and group disruption caused, the rationale for the protest, and
the economic, legal, and political costs of the action. Inevitably,
this balancing of values is individual to each action and each pro-
8. In response to a recent incident in which a woman climbed the flagpole at the
South Carolina capital, the national office of the NAACP publicly "call[ed] on state prose-
cutors to consider the moral inspiration behind the civil disobedience of this young practi-
tioner of democracy. Prosecutors should treat [the activist] with the same large-hearted
measure of justice that inspired her actions." Sammy Fretwell & Sarah Ellis, Confederate
Flag Pulled from SC Capitol Grounds By Activists, THE STATE (June 27, 2015), http:/!
www.thestate.comlnews/local~article25652377.html ('The national NAACP office com-
pared [the protester] to Henry David Thoreau, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and 'numerous
Americans who have engaged in civil disobedience."'). In the previously mentioned case
involving a protest at the Mall of America, the police noted the costs of policing the protest
and prompted the news station to report that "[t]hose [fiscal] impacts likely played a role
in the decision to charge [the protesters]." Charges Filed Against MOA Protesters, supra
note 7 ("I was shocked to see I was charged with 8 misdemeanor counts," stated one of the
individuals charged).
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tester. The specificity of these individual determinations of cul-
pability can result in widely disparate determinations as to the
culpability of a civilly disobedient protester. Some protesters are
lauded, while others are vilified. Some protesters' charges are
dismissed, while others face sentences more lengthy than their
non-protester counterparts.9
These disparate outcomes reflect a deep complexity underlying
an evaluation as to the culpability of a civilly disobedient protest-
er. The social motivation underlying even a criminal act of protest
as well as the competing societal interests at play in a protester's
trial make determinations of culpability more complex than in
ordinary criminal trials.'0 Despite the fact that civilly disobedient
protesters are distinct from non-protester criminal defendants,
the current criminal system makes no room for distinction." Giv-
en the challenges inherent in weighing the competing societal in-
terests and the lack of analogy to a traditional criminal case, this
article looks to other contexts to create a meaningful framework
in which to balance these competing interests.
The competing interests that underlie a criminal prosecution of
a civilly disobedient protester, while distinct in obvious and im-
portant ways from a traditional criminal prosecution, can be
analogized to the complex balancing of values in a death penalty
9. See Kelsey O'Connor, Charges Dismissed for 'We Are Seneca Lake" Protesters,
ITHACA J. (Mar. 19, 2015, 4:46 PM), http://www.ithacajournal.com/story/news/local/2015/
03/19/crestwood-protesters-charges-dismissed-protesters/25010935/ (Defense attorney
Sujata Gibson noted the varied responses to protest, saying that "[w]e've seen a sea
change in the way the court and the prosecutors have reacted to our cases-from maxi-
mum sentences for jail terms for trespassing violations to large-scale offers to support
dismissals in the interests of justice"); Lee Shearer, Charges Dismissed Against Demon-
strators Who Protested Regents Policy on Undocumented Students, ATHENS BANNER-
HERALD (May 29, 2015, 6:23 AM), http://onlineathens.com/uga/2015-05-29/charges-
dismissed-aganst-demonstrators-who-protested-regents-policy-undocumented (th  County
Solicitor declined to prosecute the protesters, stating that "prosecuting the cases would not
serve the public interest nor the interests of justice...").
10. See Henry M. Hart, Jr. The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 404 (1958) (asserting that the distinguishing factor of criminal law is that it involves
the community's condemnation); Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the
Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 201, 206 (1996).
11. Under current criminal jurisprudence, there may be very little recognition of the
distinctions between a civilly disobedient protesters and a non-protester criminal defend-
ant. An attempt by the protester to introduce evidence of his distinct motivation is likely
to be turned away as not relevant. See Martin L. Loesch, Motive Testimony and a Civil
Disobedience Justification, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 1064, 1100-02
(1991) (concluding that criminal law generally rejects motive testimony in civil disobedi-
ence cases).
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case." Death penalty proceedings acknowledge the social desire
for retribution, and yet the significant procedural imitations re-
quired in a capital proceeding recognize equally weighty concerns
as to fairness, equity, finality, and individuation.3 In a capital
case, the balancing of these interests is accomplished by individ-
ualized determinations in which the jury balances factors and
makes a judgment as to community condemnation. This require-
ment of an individual determination-though existing in tension
with other goals, including consistency across sentences and the
avoidance of arbitrary sentences-is essential and necessary to
impose a sentence of death.14
One obvious difficulty with drawing analogies from capital cas-
es is that death penalty jurisprudence has held itself apart with
the concept that "death is different," and the proceedings underly-
ing these cases are distinct from non-capital proceedings." Among
12. Though I analogize aspects of protester trials with capital proceedings, I do not
intend in any way to diminish the severity of a proceeding in which the government seeks
authorization to take a human life. In the words of the incomparable Anthony Amsterdam,
The decisions that lawyers make and mediate in capital prosecutions come as
close to exercising God's own powers as humanity can come. Not only is the
judgment to take life irreversible; it is literally incomprehensible. Whatever
else we humans know, life and death are mysteries beyond our understand-
ing; and when we decree that a person's life is forfeited, however solemnly,
however righteously, we commit an act whose nature and whose consequenc-
es we cannot pretend to grasp.
Symposium, A Review of the Administration of the Death Penalty and the Need for a Na-
tionwide Response to the ABA's Moratorium Call, 4 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 117, 120 (2002).
13. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing
that there are special procedural safeguards in death penalty cases); Claire Finkelstein,
Death and Retribution, 21 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 12, 13 (2002) (arguing that death penalty
proponents' reliance on retributivist theories of punishment is misplaced).
14. The decision to impose the death penalty cannot be prescribed by law or imposed
by a judge; it must be imposed by a jury. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (holding that the deci-
sion as to the existence of aggravating factors, which makes a defendant eligible for a
death sentence, must be made by a jury); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976) (finding that, despite concerns about inconsistent application of the death penalty,
a capital scheme that limits discretion by imposing categorical death sentences is imper-
missible); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S., 782, 801 (1982) (stating that when impos-
ing the death penalty, an offender's "punishment must be tailored to his personal respon-
sibility and moral guilt"); Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment,
and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 290 (1991) ("[A]ll mandatory
schemes by their nature circumscribe the range of moral considerations that are taken
into account in an individual case to those which happen to be reflected in the substantive
criminal law's doctrinal provisions.").
15. The other, and more obvious, difference is that an execution is a uniquely severe
punishment. As a former capital defender, I in no way intend to minimize the importance
of proceedings in which the government seeks legal justification to kill.
2016]
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the rationales underlying death's difference are concepts that the
severity of the sentence and the finality inherent in its imposition
are unique. While certainly valid distinctions, these rationales do
not tell the whole story as to why death penalty jurisprudence is
held out as distinct. A distinction cited frequently by the Supreme
Court is that the moral complexity of balancing the complex is-
sues requires a community determination as to societal norms.6
While certainly different in terms of severity, the complex balanc-
ing required in death penalty proceedings can inform the weigh-
ing of values in protester trials. In both proceedings the determi-
nation is complex and morally based, and the need for a
community conscience is particularly appropriate.
Death penalty jurisprudence, once an island unto itself, is
evolving and its reach expanding. Since 2010, two broad jurispru-
dential trends, one in interpretations of the Eighth Amendment
and the other in the Sixth Amendment jury trial arena, have
eroded the partition between capital and non-capital offenses.
The significance of these jurisprudential shifts can hardly be
overstated, and their implications are just beginning to be felt.
One unassailable conclusion is that, while the distinction between
a sentence of death and imprisonment is unmistakable, the juris-
prudential line between capital jurisprudence and non-capital
criminal jurisprudence is eroding.
While the jurisprudential shifts in death penalty law resonate
in a number of legal contexts, they provide particularly signifi-
cant insight in trials of protesters. Acts of civil disobedience,
though criminal, are in fact unlike ordinary criminal acts, and, as
in the capital arena, significant competing values underlie the
criminal prosecution of acts of civil disobedience. To courts and
juries facing the challenge of navigating the complex, competing
interests involved, death penalty jurisprudence can provide some
guidance. As trials of protesters implicate important competing
16. Juries "reflect more accurately the composition and experiences of the community
as a whole" and are thus "more likely to 'express the conscience of the community on the
ultimate question of life or death."' Ring, 536 U.S. at 615-16 (quoting Withurspoon v. Illi-
nois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)); see also Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 60 (1980) (stating that retribution is an expression of the will of the community);
Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 155-56 (2004) (noting that the right to jury trial "has nothing to
do with 'the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency"' of a jury, but that a jury trial is
more "free" in that it allows a community check on government power).
[Vol. 50:737
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community values, determinations as to community condemna-
tion are appropriate. Capital jurisprudence provides an illustra-
tion of how individualized determinations of moral blameworthi-
ness can ensure community participation in balancing the
complex, competing values underlying the prosecution of crimi-
nally disobedient protesters.
Part I of this article discusses the rationales underlying con-
cepts of death as different and the procedural requirements-
including input by the jury-necessitated by the deeply moral na-
ture of an execution determination. Part II of the article discusses
two independent jurisprudential shifts that expand jurispruden-
tial requirements previously confined to the death penalty arena.
The final section, Part III, discusses the legal and moral under-
pinnings of civilly disobedient protest, the important community
role in evaluating the culpability of civilly disobedient protesters,
and the implications of recognizing civilly disobedient protest as
different. The article concludes that evolving concepts in death
penalty jurisprudence provide helpful analytical constructs for
determining culpability in trials of civilly disobedient protesters.
I. "DEATH IS DIFFERENT" JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Bases for "Death Is Different" Jurisprudence
The first articulation of death's difference by the high court is
found in Justice Brennan's concurrence in the 1972 per curium
opinion of Furman v. Georgia.17 Invalidating Georgia's death pen-
alty scheme, Furman ushered in a de facto moratorium on capital
punishment in the United States."8 Four years after Furman, in
Gregg v. Georgia, a plurality of the Court reiterated the rhetoric
of difference while upholding the constitutionality of Georgia's
17. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding "that the
imposition and carrying out of the death penalty" would have amounted to "cruel and unu-
sual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments").
18. Though Furman's impact was significant, the Justices' opinions were fractured,
and the case did not produce a majority opinion. Despite the divergence, two concurring
Justices articulated the concept that death is different. Justice Brennan, in his concur-
rence noted that the death penalty "is a unique punishment" and "in a class by itself." Id.
at 286, 289 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart articulated the oft-cited opinion that
"[t]he penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree
but in kind." Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
2016]
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new death penalty statute.'9 In the more than thirty years since
Furman, the language of difference has been reiterated many
times by the Supreme Court." Though, as this article discusses,
the parameters and implications of death's difference have
evolved over the life of the doctrine, it is well-settled that "death
is different."21
The jurisprudential result of acknowledging death as different
from other sanctions is the recognition that capital proceedings
can be imposed only if the procedures employed are sufficient to
guide the decision maker through the complex values at play.2" A
set of procedural systems has arisen in order to implement these
heightened protections, designed to ensure both that a defendant
is "actually guilty" of the offense and that a death sentence is the
"appropriate" punishment.22
19. 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion). The joint opinion of Justices Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens both acknowledged the "uniqueness" of the death penalty and stated
that the "penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment." Id.
20. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012) (noting prior recognition that
"death is different"); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 103 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the application of jurisprudence previously reserved for capital proceedings and
dramatically stating '"[d]eath is different' no longer"); Ring, 536 U.S. at 605-06 (noting
that there is "no doubt that '[d]eath is different"'); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 340
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihis Court has consistently acknowledged the unique-
ness of the punishment of death."); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 463 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (calling attention to the "previously unquestioned principle" that
unique safeguards are necessary because "the death penalty is qualitatively different ...
."); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) (noting the Court's recognition of the
'qualitative difference' of the death penalty"); id. at 468 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that the "death penalty is qualitatively different" and
"must be accompanied by unique safeguards . .."); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978) (plurality) (stating that "death is qualitatively different . . ."); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Tihe penalty of death is
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.").
21. Justice Stevens wrote in 1984 that "[i]n the 12 years since Furman v. Georgia...
every Member of this Court has written or joined at least one opinion endorsing the propo-
sition that because of its severity and irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively dif-
ferent from any other punishment ..." Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Though this unanimity likely no longer exists, see Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337-38, 345 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting), it still has a strong
precedential basis and the support of a majority of the Court.
22. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983) ("death is different" jurisprudence
"mandates careful scrutiny in the review of any colorable claim of error"). According to
Hugo Bedau, the determination of the difference of death is a means to employing a varie-
ty of "standards that govern capital cases." HUGO BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT: STUDIES
IN THE MORALITY, LAW, AND POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 236 (1987).
23. The courts have struggled with questions as to the degree to which the Constitu-
tion requires substantive accuracy, as opposed to just greater procedural protections in
capital proceedings. Compare Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231, 1239 (1984) (Bren-
[Vol. 50:737
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The first step in a capital sentencing proceeding is a narrowing
of the scope of those offenders sentenced to death. This first step
attempts to ensure that the death penalty is reserved for only
"the worst of the worst,"24 by distinguishing death-eligible offens-
es from others for which a death sentence is not appropriate. In
this initial filtering, an individual becomes eligible for a sentence
of death only upon the finding of one or more aggravating circum-
stances.26 The potential aggravators that render an individual eli-
gible for execution are limited and must be delineated by stat-
ute." Only upon a finding of one or more of the statutory
aggravating factors does an individual become eligible for imposi-
tion of a death sentence.2 s
If an individual is found eligible for a death sentence pursuant
to step one, capital sentencing jurisprudence requires an inquiry
to determine the existence of factors mitigating implementation
of the death penalty. Under step two, mitigating circumstances
nan, J., dissenting) ("It is an outright abdication of our responsibility to minimize the risk
that innocent people are put to death."), with Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)
('"[A]ctual innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim .... "). Despite the Court's rhetori-
cal struggles, it is unlikely that current protections actually "ensure" either the guilt of the
defendant or a sentence free from impermissible bias or arbitrary factors. See Steven F.
Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics: Furman, McCleskey,
and a Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOzO L. REV. 1227, 1275 (2013) (statistically
showing disparities in the imposition of the death penalty based on factors including the
"race of neighborhood" of the defendant).
24. See, e.g., Penny J. White, Can Lightning Strike Twice? Obligations of State Courts
After Pulley v. Harris, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 813, 866 (1999) ("[B]y appropriately narrowing
death eligibility [the Court intended that] ... the death penalty could adequately be re-
served for the 'worst of the worst."'); Zant, 462 U.S. at 877 ("[A]n aggravating circum-
stance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to
others found guilty of murder.").
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2012); see also Zant, 462 U.S. at 877.
26. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994); Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S.
463, 474 (1993) ("If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance
applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitution-
ally infirm.") (emphasis added).
27. The requirement that aggravating factors be specifically delineated by statute is
an attempt to ameliorate concerns regarding the arbitrary imposition of the penalty. See,
e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258 (1976) ("[T]he requirements of Furman are satis-
fied when the sentencing authority's discretion is guided and channeled by requiring ex-
amination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of the death pen-
alty, thus eliminating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its imposition.").
28. See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(finding that mitigation is necessary to ensure that a sentence is "a reasoned moral re-
sponse to the defendant's background, character, and crime rather than mere sympathy or
emotion") (emphasis added).
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cannot be limited or defined in contrast to the way aggravating
factors must be limited and defined at step one. Instead, under
step two, the sentencer must be permitted to consider "any aspect
of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death."9 In this second step, once mitigating circum-
stances are presented, the proceedings require a balancing of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and a determination of
the moral propriety of a sentence of death.3" The moral determi-
nations that underlie capital proceedings are the subject of the
next section.
B. Moral Determinations in Capital Proceedings
Though legal scholars point to the moral underpinnings of all
criminal verdicts, and even of law in general, judicial rhetoric of-
ten omits mention of the underlying morality of legal determina-
tions."' One of the distinctions of capital jurisprudence is that
29. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); see also Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S.
1, 7 (1994) ("States cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant circumstance
that could cause it to decline to impose the penalty. In this respect, the State cannot chan-
nel the sentencer's discretion, but must allow it to consider any relevant information of-
fered by the defendant.") (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987)).
30. Some states, such as Colorado, break this second step into two independent de-
terminations: whether the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circum-
stances; and the moral determination as to whether the sentence of death is appropriate
whether the defendant is so morally culpable as to have lost the entitlement to live. See
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a) (2012). The procedures were recently on display with
the trial of Aurora theater shooter, James Holmes, in which the jury, despite finding all
requirements for execution, made the final moral determination at Colorado step three to
spare Holmes's life. See Revealed: Families of Slain Victims in Dark Knight Massacre
Walked Out of Colorado Courtroom on Hearing Holmes Had Avoided Death Sentence,
DAILYMAIL (Aug. 8, 2015, 8:53 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3190686/
Families-slain-victims-Dark-Knight-massacre-WALK-Colorado-courtroom-verdict-read-
saying-James-Holmes-spend-rest-life-prison.html.
31. See Erik Hagen, The Moral Judiciary: Restoring Morality as a Basis of Judicial
Decision-Making, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 139, 141, 157 (2013) (arguing for expressly incor-
porating morality into judicial decision making); Nancy S. Kim, Blameworthiness, Intent,
and Cultural Dissonance: The Unequal Treatment of Cultural Defense Defendants, 17 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POLY 199, 216 (2006) (explaining that the level of culpability attached to
a criminal act is a direct reflection of society's moral judgment of that act); Daniel F. Piar,
Morality as a Legitimate Government Interest, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 139, 140 (2012)
("[Tihe Court's inconsistency with regard to morals legislation ill serves the goals of a plu-
ralistic, federalist society."). Compare Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110
HARV. L. REV. 991, 992 (1997) ('The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral
life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race."), with Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) ('Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate gov-
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courts expressly acknowledge the moral foundation underlying
capital proceedings.32 This judgment as to the "moral guilt" of the
defendant is the final-and essential-part of every capital sen-
tencing proceeding.3 The moral foundation of these determina-
tions in a capital case arises from the complex balancing of fac-
tors required to determine whether the culpability of an
individual is so great as to establish that the person has "lost his
moral entitlement to live."34 Justice O'Connor has stated that "the
individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death
penalty is a moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant"5
and indicated that imposition of a death sentence should repre-
sent a "reasoned moral response" to the offender and the offense.3"
Acknowledging the potential distinction between law and morali-
ty, the Court has said that "in the final analysis, capital punish-
ment rests on not a legal but an ethical judgment-an assessment
of... the 'moral guilt' of the defendant."7 Moral balancing is an
essential component of a valid capital sentencing scheme and one
ernmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause ....").
32. For recent Supreme Court discussions of the moral determination inherent in a
death penalty determination, see Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct 1, 2 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing from denial of stay) ("I would focus upon the 'moral sensibility' of a community that
finds in the death sentence an appropriate public reaction to a terrible crime."); Abdul-
Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 263-64 (2007) ("Our line of cases in this area has long
recognized that before a jury can undertake the grave task of imposing a death sentence, it
must be allowed to consider a defendant's moral culpability and decide whether death is
an appropriate punishment for that individual in light of his personal history and charac-
teristics and the circumstances of the offense."). See also Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Pun-
ishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143,
1159 (1980) ('The substantive judgment to be made [in a capital sentencing proceeding] is
a moral judgment: Does this person deserve death as punishment?").
33. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989); California v. Brown, 479
U.S. 538, 545 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330
(1985); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468-69 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 320 (1976) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (describing the determination as to whether a sentence of death is morally
justified as "a truly awesome responsibility").
34. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 469. The utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham argued
that, at a minimum, the death penalty must be reserved for "offences which in the highest
degree shock the public feeling-to murders accompanied with circumstances of aggrava-
tion." BENTHAMIANA: OR, SELECT EXTRACTS FROM THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 319
(John Hill Burton ed., 1998); see also BEDAU, supra note 22, at 66.
35. Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. Penry, 492 U.S. at 319.
37. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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that the Court has described as a "truly awesome responsibil-
ity.
,38
Determination of entitlement to life must be made individually
in each case.39 The imposition of a death sentence should repre-
sent a "reasoned moral response" specific to the offender and the
offense." Because balancing culpability is individual, a death sen-
tence cannot be mandated by law and its imposition must be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis.4' Among the most important of
the procedures ensuring an individualized determination is that
an individual is qualified to sit as a juror on a death penalty sen-
tencing only if the juror has the ability to be swayed both in favor
of mitigation or aggravation." Not only can this individual moral
weighting not be removed from the jury's shoulders, but the bur-
den cannot even be eased; it is impermissible for a party or the
court to lighten or reduce the jury's ultimate responsibility with
regard to the determination of whether to impose a death sen-
tence.43
The mandate of individuation, though one of the cornerstones
of capital jurisprudence, exists in tension alongside significant
concerns about consistent application of death sentences.4' Arbi-
38. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 320; Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330 (1985).
39. See Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he individualized as-
sessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty is a moral inquiry into the culpabil-
ity of the defendant .... ").
40. Penry, 492 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added).
41. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331, 336 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding
unconstitutional Louisiana's sentencing statute in mandating a death sentence upon con-
viction of certain offenses); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality
opinion) ('There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authori-
ty should be used to impose death. But a statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital
cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that
the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penal-
ty. When the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable .... ).
42. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 736 (1992) (holding impermissible under the
Fourteenth Amendment and a line of capital jurisprudence that a defendant be sentenced
by a juror who has indicated an unwillingness to be swayed by mitigation evidence); see
also id. at 751-52 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[O]bscured within the fog of confusion that is
our... 'death is different' jurisprudence, the Court strikes a further blow against the Peo-
ple in its campaign against the death penalty. Not only must mercy be allowed, but now
only the merciful may be permitted to sit in judgment.").
43. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330-31.
44. Justice Stewart in his Furman concurrence expressed concern about arbitrary im-
position of the punishment, invoking oft-cited concerns that the punishment was imposed
so "wantonly," "freakishly," and "capriciously" that it was as if the unfortunate defendant
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trariness was a central concern to members of the majority in the
Court's 1972 Furman decision."5 In assessing the arbitrariness
that infected Georgia's system for the imposition of death sen-
tences, significant responsibility seemed to lie on the state's lack
of procedures to guide sentencing discretion." Capital jurispru-
dence since Furman has, to a large extent, been defined by the
struggle to balance the mandate of individual determinations
with the need to avoid "wanton and arbitrary" imposition of death
sentences.7 In the ten years following Furman, much of the
Court's rhetoric in capital cases focused on its concerns as to the
arbitrary application of the penalty.s In recent years, however,
capital jurisprudence has moved away from concerns of con-
sistency in favor of considerations of individuation.49
In order to allow for individualized moral determinations, there
must exist both a voice for community values and a mechanism
for channeling that input into criminal trials. The next section
discusses the essential role of the jury as the conscience of the
had been "struck by lightning." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart,
J., concurring). Justice Stewart's concerns were echoed by other Justices in their individu-
al Furman opinions. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 260 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); id. at 311 (White, J., concurring); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 300 (Stewart, J., concurring). Cornell
Professor Stephen Garvey criticizes the Court's somewhat inconsistent jurisprudence on
mercy in capital proceedings as leading to a system that lacks consistency. Stephen P.
Garvey, 'As the Gentle Rain From Heaven" Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 989, 992 (1996) ("[Tjhe Court has no coherent understanding of mercy or its place in
the structure of the penalty phase of a capital trial.").
46. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 249-50 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Finally, there is
evidence that the imposition of the death sentence and the exercise of dispensing power by
the courts and the executive follow discriminatory patterns. The death sentence is dispro-
portionately imposed and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopu-
lar groups.") (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 143 (1967)).
47. The struggle to reconcile the desire for individualized determinations as to the
propriety of a death sentence in any case with the desire for consistency and fairness in
imposition of the penalty defined much post-Furman capital jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Abramson, supra note 16, at 125-26. Professor Stephen Garvey describes the "constitu-
tional history of the penalty phase" as "the history of a supposed paradox between the
goals of consistency and individualization .... " Garvey, supra note 45, at 994.
48. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("'These death sentences are
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusu-
al.... [T]he petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the
sentence of death has in fact been imposed.").
49. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (invalidating the
North Carolina statute for "failure to allow the particularized consideration of relevant
aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon
him of a sentence of death"); see also Abramson, supra note 16, at 124-25.
20161
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
community in balancing competing interests and evaluating an
individual's level of blameworthiness.
C. The Essential Role of the Jury
An evaluation of culpability is an essential part of a criminal
trial. Though imperative that culpability be determined, it is less
clear who must make the determination. We tend to think of the
jury as the conscience of the community and the appropriate enti-
ty for determinations of criminal culpability. The other institu-
tional actors in criminal proceedings lack the jury's ability to rep-
resent the community conscience.5" This section begins by briefly
evaluating each of these other institutional actors-legislators,
prosecutors, and judges-as potential substitutes for the jury in
making the requisite determination of condemnation in a crimi-
nal case.1 Concluding that only the jury has the potential to
translate community norms into legal consequence, this section
explores the essential role of the jury in the criminal justice sys-
tem.
As representative bodies whose election and retention depends
upon their conformity with community sentiment, legislatures
are arguably good barometers of the democratic will of the elec-
torate and the moral conscience of the community.52 As directly
50. Though this article looks at these actors independently, it can also be useful to
view the capital system holistically with each institutional actor playing a role in deter-
mining the propriety of the judgment. Professors Richard A. Bierschbach and Stephanos
Bibas have done this in their 2013 article Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment. Richard
A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment, 112 MICH. L.
REV. 397, 409 (2013) ('The Court's constitutional regulation of the death penalty has thus
resulted in a system in which capital sentencing determinations are filtered through mul-
tiple viewpoints that act as vetogates, giving each actor a chance to influence the process
and kick the defendant out of the pipeline.").
51. Governors and Presidents also have a limited role through executive clemency,
but they are inadequate representatives of community values in any but a very limited
number of cases. See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Improving Criminal Jus-
tice: How Can We Make the American Criminal Justice System More Just?, 95 JUDICATURE
59, 59 (2011).
52. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) ("[T]he 'clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the coun-
try's legislatures."') (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)). But see William
J. Bowers et al., Too Young for the Death Penalty: An Empirical Examination of Communi-
ty Conscience and the Juvenile Death Penalty from the Perspective of Capital Jurors, 84
B.U. L. REV. 609, 619 (2004); Craig Haney, Commonsense Justice and Capital Punish-
ment: Problematizing the 'Will of the People", 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 303, 318-22
(1997) (identifying and analyzing the inherent problems of relying on legislative action to
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elected representatives, they are arguably as close to a substitute
for the community as we have.3 Upon examination, however, giv-
ing legislatures the responsibility to be the voice of community
norms presents significant difficulties. For one thing, legislators,
though elected, are likely to be influenced not just by community
will but also by political pressure, special interests, and election
posturing.4 Another problem is that legislative enactments "are
remarkably opaque," and this inherent ambiguity of legislative
actions makes it difficult to use legislative intent to discern any
authoritative interpretation.5 Even more than the pressures and
opacity, however, it is the prospective nature of all legislative ac-
tions that make lawmakers particularly unsuited to the role of
community conscience. While lawmakers can define offenses, or
even abolish offenses or penalties, legislating is broad, and law-
making lacks the individualization that is required in criminal
trials.56 The importance of individualized determinations in crim-
inal proceedings is critical to provide a meaningful check on gen-
eralized support for a "tough on crime" approach.7
infer popular sentiment).
53. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 325-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that public
opinion polls should not be given weight unless "the elected representatives of a State's
populace have not deemed them persuasive enough to prompt legislative action").
54. See, e.g., Bowers et al., supra note 52, at 619-20 ('legislatures are a cauldron of
political motivations and electoral concerns whose members play at least as large a role in
creating and exploiting popular opinion as they do attempting to objectively assess it. The
crass politicization of criminal justice issues over the last several decades has rendered the
typical legislature 'a dubious barometer' of public opinion .. "); see also Bierschbach &
Bibas, supra note 50, at 403.
55. John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of "Unusual" The Eighth Amendment
as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1739, 1752-53 (2008) (noting the inher-
ent ambiguity of legislation, utilizing the example of one statutory scheme to illustrate the
distinct conclusions that could be drawn: "If a state legislature imposes the death penalty
for murder but not for rape, does this mean that the legislature morally condemns the
death penalty for rape? Or might such legislation reflect a relatively weak policy
preference? Might it merely reflect the pragmatic judgment that imposition of the death
penalty for rape is likely to be struck down by the Supreme Court?").
56. See, e.g., Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 50, at 403, 412 (noting that legislatures
can make only the first, broad, determination of appropriate culpability).
57. For example, in evaluating imposition of death sentences in California, studies by
psychology professor Craig Haney have indicated that, despite "widespread abstract sup-
port for the death penalty," when faced with certain categories of defendants or certain
types of mitigation, "substantial numbers of people [are] unwilling to impose the death
penalty .. " Haney, supra note 52, at 321. The implications of Dr. Haney's research indi-
cate that the specifics of a situation matter and the legislative determination of the pro-
priety of a death sentence in the abstract may not correlate to an individualized determi-
nation of the morally appropriate sentence. Id.; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the
Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U.
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Criminal prosecutors play a significant role in charging and
plea decisions. Structurally, the prosecutor is fashioned as coun-
sel for the state, government, or community and is charged with
the "exercise [of] professional judgment, as the ABA Criminal
Justice Standard directs, 'solely for the benefit of the client-the
people-free of any compromising influences or loyalties.',58 For
that reason, the prosecutor's ethical obligations compel focus not
on victory but on seeing that justice is done.59 Like legislatures,
however, as an institutional actor, prosecutors fall short as a sub-
stitute for the jury. Prosecutors work closely with the police and
often identify with the goal of conviction." They may also labor
under competing incentives; those with ambition to higher office
may be motivated by the perception that a "tough on crime"
stance will appeal to voters or that a high-profile conviction will
be better for their career.61 Even setting aside personal ambition
or political pressures on the part of prosecutors, systemic pres-
sures encourage prosecutorial overcharging in order to ensure ex-
tra room for plea negotiations, which can skew outcomes and lead
to unjust results.62 Thus, even in uncomplicated decisions, some
studies have shown that a prosecutor may tend to act "according
PA. L. REV. 33, 62 (2003) [hereinafter Barkow, Recharging the Jury] ("As voters, people
consider the perceived overall threat of crime and tend to be harsher than when they are
presented with a concrete case.").
58. Bennet L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims' Rights: The Prosecutor's
Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 579 (2005); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE § 3-1.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1993); cf. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3.13 (AM.
BAR ASS'N 2015) ('"The prosecutor generally serves the public and not any particular gov-
ernment agency, law enforcement office or unit, witness, or victim.").
59. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.9 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) ("A pros-
ecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of
criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by proba-
ble cause. A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the contin-
ued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to sup-
port a conviction."); see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.11 (AM. BAR AsS'N
2015) ("A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make timely disclosure to the defense,
at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of all evidence or information which
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or which would
tend to reduce the punishment of the accused.").
60. See Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of Prosecutorial Charg-
ing Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion-Knowing there Will be Conse-
quences for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371, 382 (2000).
61. See id. at 382-83; Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 50, at 424. See also Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ('Those who wrote our constitutions knew from histo-
ry and experience that [the right to a jury] was necessary to protect against unfounded
criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and .... against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor .... ).
62. See Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 50, at 424.
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to idiosyncratic rules, norms, preferences, and biases."3 At least
as currently structured under our adversarial system, prosecutors
are just as likely to need to be kept in check as they are to effec-
tively function as-a neutral community conscience.
Neither is the judiciary likely to serve as an effective con-
science of the community. Though "[t]he first requirement of a
sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual
feelings and demands of the community,"4 ethical rules require
that individual judicial determinations be driven by factors out-
side either the judge's personal feelings or community con-
science.65 Additionally, judges are often unelected and, at least for
those in the federal system, enjoy lifetime appointments, attrib-
utes designed to insulate judges from the pressures of community
sentiment.6 These features are likely to have the effect of remov-
ing judges from reliably expressing community norms and val-
ues." While the perception of judges as entirely neutral is but
mythology,6" their attempts at insulation and neutrality likely
render them unreliable harbingers of community norms or val-
69ues.
63. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1723 (2010) (evaluating prosecutorial choices regard-
ing whether to proceed or dismiss petty offenses). For a brilliant general critique of the
role of prosecutors in the expanding system of criminal liability, see William J. Stuntz,
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
64. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 28 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2009); see
also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 380-81 (1986) ("An actual [judge] must sometimes
adjust what he believes to be right as a matter of principle, and therefore as a matter of
law, in order to gain the votes of other [judges] and to make their joint decision sufficiently
acceptable to the community so that it can continue to act in the spirit of a community of
principle ... ").
65. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2011). A com-
ment to the rule provides, in part, that "[an independent judiciary requires that judges
decide cases according to the law and facts, without regard to whether particular laws or
litigants are popular or unpopular with the public, the media, government officials, or the
judge's friends or family." Id.
66. See id. ("A judge shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism.").
67. "Judges, it is sometimes necessary to remind ourselves, are part of the State-and
an increasingly bureaucratic part of it, at that." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498
(2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
68. See, e.g., Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3, 59 (1994)
("[J]udges disserve themselves and the system if they presume that bias and prejudice do
not enter the decisionmaking process .. "); JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND
REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 414 (1949).
69. For an interesting discussion of the difficulties of determining a single community
norm, generally and specifically of relying on judges as harbingers of those norms, see
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Given the institutional options, most scholars and non-scholars
agree that the jury is the primary entity best-suited to uphold the
conscience of the community." The jury's role as conscience of the
community has deep roots.7' Since the early history of the emerg-
ing republic, the jury has been viewed as a bulwark against gov-
ernmental overreach and oppression.7' Despite scholarly wran-
Wojciech Sadurski, Conventional Morality and Judicial Standards, 73 VA. L. REV. 339,
360-65 (1987). See also, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ('Those who wrote
our constitutions knew from history and experience that [the right to a jury] was neces-
sary to protect.., against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The
framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted upon
further protection against arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the right to be tried
by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the ... compliant, biased,
or eccentric judge.").
70. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) (labeling the jury as the
"conscience of community"); Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Decisions at Conviction: Rec-
ognizing the Jury as Fault-Finder, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91, 95 (2005) ("[T]he basic justi-
fications for having a right to a jury trial always have relied in part on a sense that the
jury is a proper and fair arbiter of a criminal defendant's moral blameworthiness.");
Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381, 2382 (1999)
(discussing how criminal jury trials function not only to render judgments about culpabil-
ity but also as expressions of community responsibility and identity); see also Richard E.
Myers II, Requiring a Jury Vote of Censure to Convict, 88 N.C. L. REV. 137, 155 (2009)
('There is no more critical player in our constitutional system than the jury- .. ").
71. For one analysis of the history of juries in the early republic, see Jenia Iontcheva,
Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 316-17 (2003). According to
Iontcheva,
Legislators of many early American states abandoned the common law tradi-
tion and vested juries with sentencing power.... Reformers also thought that
juries were uniquely capable of assessing the proper punishment because, as
members of the local community, they were more likely to be well-acquainted
with the defendant's background and the particular circumstances of the of-
fense.... As punishment options expanded beyond shaming sanctions and
the mandatory death penalty and came to include various ranges and modes
of imprisonment, there was more room for case-by-case decision making to
which juries were thought to be well-suited.
Id.
72. There are volumes written on historical perceptions on the role of the jury. For a
thorough discussion of the role of the jury in criminal sentencing, see Chris Kemmitt,
Function Over Form: Reviving the Criminal Jury's Historical Role as a Sentencing Body,
40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93, 95, 98-115 (2006). Part of Kemmitt's thesis includes the idea
that the criminal jury originally contemplated by the founders of the United States Con-
stitution was to determine the law as well as the facts of a case. See id. at 103, 107. This
thesis is not universally accepted. See, e.g., Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right
of Criminal Juries to Determine the Law in Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY, 111, 121-22 (1998) (finding that the published records do not support "con-
ventional wisdom" as to the criminal jury's right to determine the law in any colony but for
Rhode Island). But see William E. Nelson, The Lawfinding Power of Colonial American
Juries, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003, 1028 (2010) (documenting a decade-long study into the
question and concluding that "[oln the issue of the lawfinding power of colonial juries, the
score is roughly tied with my research not yet completed: juries possessed ultimate power
over the law in New England and Virginia, but not in the Carolinas, New York, and Penn-
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gling over the precise contours of the historical role of the Ameri-
can jury, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that
the criminal jury serves as a backstop against governmental ac-
tion inconsistent with the community sensibility of moral norms.3
As representatives of community norms and values, juries
serve a number of functions. They promote public acceptance of
both the judicial process and the resulting verdicts.74 Juries also
satisfy an important communicative function." In the words of
one scholar, juries are intended to serve not only as a check on
out-of-touch legislatures and overzealous prosecutors, but also on
the judiciary as well since "[j]udges acting without juries could do
outrageous deeds . . . ."" By undertaking this evaluation, juries
provide a backstop against government overreaching, over-
criminalization, and the application of statutes that have ossified
outdated values or social mores." The jury thus operates as an
sylvania").
73. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984) ("We do not denigrate the
significance of the jury's role as a link between the community and the penal system and
as a bulwark between the accused and the State."); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100
(1970) ('The purpose of the jury trial ... is to prevent oppression by the Government."); see
also FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) ('The friends and adversaries of the plan of
the convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the
trial by jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former re-
gard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of
free government.").
74. See, e.g., Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1368 (1985) ("[The trial process is struc-
tured in a variety of ways that encourage the public to accept judicial conclusions .... ").
75. See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 803-04 (1997).
76. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 109
(1998); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ("Providing an accused with
the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.").
77. Judge Learned Hand noted that
The institution of trial by jury-especially in criminal cases-has its hold up-
on public favor chiefly for two reasons. The individual can forfeit his liberty-
to say nothing of his life-only at the hands of those who, unlike any official,
are in no wise accountable, directly or indirectly, for what they do, and who
at once separate and melt anonymously in the community from which they
came. Moreover, since if they acquit their verdict is final, no one is likely to
suffer of whose conduct they do not morally disapprove; and this introduces a
slack into the enforcement of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influ-
ence of current ethical conventions. A trial by any jury, however small, pre-
serves both these fundamental elements and a trial by a judge preserves nei-
ther, at least to anything like the same degree.
United States v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1942); see also Williams, 399 U.S.
at 100 (discussing the jury as a barrier "to prevent oppression by the Government").
2016]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
additional check on police, prosecutors, and judges to ensure that
these institutional actors are not the only arbiters of criminal re-
sponsibility."8 Further, jury verdicts provide feedback to prosecu-
tors, courts, and legislatures as to the community norms, ena-
bling prosecutors and legislators to conform their discretion to
community sensibilities.9
A number of structural elements empower the jury in perform-
ing its role.s° It is a foundational aspect of criminal law that ab-
sent a defendant's waiver, a jury must issue a verdict of convic-
tion; regardless of how powerful the evidence, a judge may not
direct a verdict against a criminal defendant.8 ' This unique au-
thority places the criminal jury in a position arguably superior to
that of the trial court judge. In order to ensure that the jury is un-
fettered by any judicial attempt to require justification for its
verdict, a judge may not submit special verdicts to a criminal ju-
ry.82 In a jurisprudential concept imported from England, the jury
cannot be sanctioned for its verdict, even if that verdict disre-
gards the letter of the law.3 The jury's not-guilty verdict is also
protected from appeal by the prosecution.4
In death penalty proceedings, community conscience plays an
essential part in making individualized determinations of culpa-
78. For a critique of the structural role of prosecutors as arbiters of community values
and needs, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52
STAN. L. REV. 809, 827 (2000). For a critique of the assumption in criminal law that the
judge and jury have the same cultural values and norms as a given defendant, see Kim,
supra note 31, at 201-02 (2006).
79. Professor Richard Myers argues that juries should be part of a dialogue with law-
makers and prosecutors about criminal laws and prosecutions in order to allow the regular
reevaluation of criminal laws. See Myers, supra note 70, at 142-43.
80. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156 (1968) (discussing the "common-sense judgment of
[the] jury").
81. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977) ("[A] trial
judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come
forward with such a verdict regardless of how overwhelming the evidence may point in
that direction.") (citation omitted).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 629 F.2d 439, 443 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that
the jury "has a general veto power, and this power should not be attenuated by requiring
the jury to answer in writing a detailed list of questions or explain its reasons").
83. Bushnell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1010 (C.P. 1670). See also AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 431 (2012).
84. Because judgments of conviction can be appealed while judgments of acquittal
cannot, it has been said that juries have the last word on acquittal, but not on conviction.
See AMAR, supra note 83, at 425. Professor Amar refers to this bias as one of the "pro-
defendant asymmetries" within our constitutional structure. Id.; see also Akhil Reed Am-
ar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1844 (1997).
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bility. This critical role can be served only by the jury. By under-
taking an evaluation of the blameworthiness of the defendant, ju-
ries bring social norms and values to bear on the otherwise insu-
lar process of determining criminal culpability. Though the
concept of the essential role of the jury arises in death penalty
proceedings, where it has long been held that "death is different,"
the uniqueness of capital proceedings has been eroded as its ju-
risprudential concepts have been applied in other proceedings.
The next section explores this expansion of death penalty juris-
prudence.
II. DEATH Is NO LONGER UNIQUE-EXPANSION OF "DEATH IS
DIFFERENT" JURISPRUDENCE
Enormous resources are spent on pursuit of the death penalty.
Some of these resources reflect the heightened litigation stand-
ards and the reality that parties in capital cases push jurispru-
dential limits.85 Not infrequently, death penalty proceedings pave
new legal ground. From there, what starts as death penalty juris-
prudence at times becomes general criminal law jurisprudence."
85. See generally RICHARD DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., SMART ON CRIME:
RECONSIDERING THE DEATH PENALTY IN A TIME OF ECONOMIC CRISIS, http:/Iwww. death-
penaltyinfo.org/documents/CostsRptFinal.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2015) (discussing the
reasons and amount of resources required by death penalty cases).
86. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening A Window or Building A Wall?
The Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice
More Broadly, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 155-56 (2008) ("[C]apital punishment receives a
disproportionate share of popular, political, and legal attention. The sheer number of
films, books, magazine, and newspaper articles discussing and depicting capital cases
would suggest that capital prosecutions, sentences, and executions are far more common
than they actually are. On the political side, state legislatures devote considerable atten-
tion to prevailing capital procedures and proposed reforms, despite, in relative terms, the
extraordinary infrequency of capital cases and the increasingly large share of state re-
sources consumed by non-capital incarceration.... The complete absence of any federal
policy addressing the states' unprecedented experiment with mass incarceration stands in
notable contrast to Congress's attention to the ways in which federal review of capital cas-
es can influence state capital policies."). But see Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and
Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1189 (2009) [hereinafter Barkow, The Court of Life and Death] ("Capi-
tal cases cannot be used as vehicles for reforming substantive sentencing review across the
board because the Court has put them on a separate track."). For one of the many well-
reasoned critiques of the resource allocation drawn by capital cases, see generally Douglas
A. Berman, A Capital Waste of Time? Examining the Supreme Court's Culture of Death,
34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 861 (2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court spends too much of its
time and resources in reviewing death penalty cases which results in problems for the
administration of the both capital and non-capital sentencing systems).
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A criminal defendant's rights to effective assistance of counsel,87 a
racially representative jury pool,88 access to the pre-sentence re-
port," and DNA preservation" all began with capital cases.9" The
line between protections afforded in capital proceedings and those
offered in non-capital proceedings is hard to hold and can tend
toward erosion."
Even in "death is different" jurisprudence, the line between
capital and non-capital proceedings is more permeable than the
rhetoric of "death is different" indicates. The Constitution does
not expressly distinguish between capital and non-capital crimi-
nal proceedings, and when a procedure or protection is adopted as
important or constitutionally mandated in the capital setting, it
is difficult to deny that same protection to non-capital defend-
ants.93 At the very least, the withholding from non-capital de-
fendants of protections made available in capital proceedings sub-
jects courts to regular criticism and attempts to stretch and
expand capital jurisprudence.94 Scholars and advocates are able to
87. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
88. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 588, 596 (1935).
89. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 351 (1977).
90. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 86, at 157.
91. Id. Professors Steiker and Steiker attribute much of this argument to the "much
greater indifference that courts, policy makers, and the general public display toward non-
capital criminal proceedings." Id.
92. Though the Court sometimes creates separate rules for capital proceedings, it has
also acknowledged the difficulties with a two-track approach and refused to utilize it. See,
e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314-15 (1987) (refusing to carve out a distinct set
of principles allowing the reliance on statistical evidence of systemic discrimination in cap-
ital cases).
93. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Evolving Standards of Decency in 2003-Is the
Death Penalty on Life Support?, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 201, 220 (2004) ("[A] general ap-
proach that says that death is different doesn't make sense under the Constitution.");
Barkow, The Court of Life and Death, supra note 86, at 1162-63 ("One can hardly argue
with the Court's claim that death is a different kind of punishment. But as a matter of
constitutional law, that does not get to the heart of the legal question raised by the two
tracks.... [Tihe Court's claim of difference must be analyzed to determine whether it is
not merely factually true, but legally significant."); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 86, at
204 ('"To recognize that 'death is different' is also to assert that incarceration (as opposed
to death) is different, too-less severe, less final, less problematic, and less worthy of at-
tention. In light of our current crisis of mass incarceration, we need to be wary of any such
implication.").
94. See, e.g., Mary Berkheiser, Death Is Not So Different After All: Graham v. Florida
and the Court's 'Kids Are Different" Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 36 VT. L. REV. 1,
37 (2011) ("The deeply troubling question that remains is why.., non-capital proportion-
ality review withers on the vine while capital punishment review flourishes, as ever-
increasing considerations hold sway with the Court."); Barkow, The Court of Life and
Death, supra note 86, at 1171 ('Once the Court recognizes a constitutional right, it should
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point to areas of law in which capital cases have led the way in
the institution of criminal justice reforms generally.95
Despite some analytical incoherence, the divide between death
penalty jurisprudence and non-capital criminal jurisprudence
remained largely intact until 2010. Between 2010 and 2015, how-
ever, two broad jurisprudential trends eroded the partition be-
tween capital and non-capital offenses. The first trend has been
described by one scholar as a radical expansion of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.96 The second shift is seen in the
sharpening focus on the important role of the jury in criminal
proceedings.97 These trends can be viewed and analyzed in con-
cert, as part of a more fundamental structural shift toward the
incorporation of community norms and values into complex crim-
inal determinations.98 The next two sections will discuss these
trends.
A. Expanding Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."99 Its simple
language, however, belies complex underlying jurisprudence. Un-
derstanding the doctrine's expansion requires wading into some
recognize the right for all, not just for those who might need the protection the most.").
95. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671, 687 (1984) (recognizing that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel necessarily includes the right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 588-89 (1935) (finding the exclusion of
African Americans from the grand and petit jury pools unconstitutional in this "Scottsboro
defendant" case); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 86, at 157 ('The death penalty, on
this view, keeps criminal justice issues at the forefront of political and legal debate, and
concerns about the fairness and reliability of the death penalty might trickle down to the
much larger non-capital realm.").
96. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 50, at 416; see also William W. Berry III, The
Mandate of Miller, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327, 328 (2014) [hereinafter Berry, The Mandate
of Miller] ("Recently... the Court has twice breached this formerly impervious barrier
between capital and non-capital cases."). The Eighth Amendment provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
97. See discussion infra Part II.B.
98. For an excellent discussion of the unifying aspects of the Sixth and Eighth
Amendment lines of cases and the authors' hypotheses as to what they foretell, see
Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 50, at 452 ("Through Graham and Apprendi, the Court is
awkwardly using rights-based doctrines to change the structures of criminal justice to en-
sure deliberation about individualized, morally appropriate sentences.").
99. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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of the complexities. This section will discuss the two major, and
until recently quite distinct, threads of Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence and how two recent cases have woven them together to
create a jurisprudence applicable outside the capital arena.
Prior to 2010, application of the Eighth Amendment to non-
capital criminal sentences reflected "a clear separation between
capital and non-capital cases" and "restraint and deference to the
states" in matters of proportionality.1 ' In contrast to the standard
applied in capital cases, Eighth Amendment review in non-capital
cases essentially consisted of a narrow proportionality review.0 '
The non-capital review is limited and, according to the Court, the
Eighth Amendment "does not require strict proportionality be-
tween crime and sentence," instead "forbid[ing] only extreme sen-
tences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime."'0 2 As the
Supreme Court has acknowledged, under the parameters of the
doctrine, "it has been difficult for the challenger to establish a
lack of proportionality" in non-capital cases.0 3 In capital cases, on
the other hand, the Supreme Court looks to the "evolving stand-
ards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," to
determine whether a sentence of death is in line with contempo-
rary values." The standard used in capital cases of looking to
community values is much more robust than the non-capital
standard.10
Two contemporary Supreme Court cases, Graham v. Florida,
decided in 2010, and Miller v. Alabama, decided in 2012, illus-
trate the recent expansion of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
as the standard previously applicable only in capital cases has
100. William W. Berry 1II, More Different Than Life, Less Different Than Death: The
Argument for According Life Without Parole Its Own Category of Heightened Review Under
the Eighth Amendment After Graham v. Florida, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109, 1120 (2010) [here-
inafter Berry, More Different Than Life].
101. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) ("A gross disproportionality princi-
ple is applicable to sentences for terms of years.").
102. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997, 1000-01 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment).
103. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 59.
104. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958)).
105. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 68, 72; see also Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right
Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 678-79 (2005) (finding four categories
of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: torturous punishments; punishments that are dis-
proportionate to the crimes for which they are imposed; capital cases; and punishments
that are unconstitutionally administered).
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been applied in non-capital arenas. The facts underlying the Gra-
ham v. Florida opinion involve a sixteen-year-old who received a
sentence of life imprisonment for armed burglary and sought to
invalidate that life sentence."6 Rather than relying on the almost
universally unsuccessful "narrow proportionality principles" ap-
plied to non-capital offenses, Graham asked the Court to apply
the categorical analysis applicable to capital cases.°7 He claimed
that his situation implicated the entire category of juvenile of-
fenders sentenced to life sentences and merited, not a narrow
proportionality review, but the "evolving standards of decency"
review utilized in capital cases.10S
The majority of the Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Kennedy, not only fully engaged the Eighth Amendment issue as
framed by Graham, but also agreed with him and applied the
broader categorical analysis to the juvenile's non-capital case.1 0 9
The Court acknowledged that Graham's claim was not cognizable
under the then-existing jurisprudence."' Missing from the majori-
ty opinion, however, was a discussion of the implications of the
opinion on capital jurisprudence and, especially, on concepts of
death's difference."' This omission from the majority opinion was
not overlooked by the other Justices. Chief Justice Roberts noted
that "[t]reating juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital
punishment is at odds with our longstanding view that 'the death
penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather than
106. Graham, 560 U.S. at 53-54, 57-58. Graham was sentenced originally to probation.
Upon violating the terms of his probation, the trial court had discretion to impose a sen-
tence of between five years and life. The probation report recommended a sentence below
the statutory minimum, the defendant asked for five years, and the state argued for a
thirty-year sentence on the charge. The trial court imposed a life sentence. Id. at 54-57.
107. Id. at 61-62, 125 ("The present case involves an issue the Court has not consid-
ered previously: a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence .... [H]ere a sentenc-
ing practice itself is in question. This case implicates a particular type of sentence as it
applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes.").
108. Id. at 125 (Alito, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 74-75. See also Berry, More Different Than Life, supra note 100, at 1122
(claiming that "[t]he Court has crossed, without explanation, the clear and previously un-
questioned Eighth Amendment divide between capital and non-capital cases" in the Gra-
ham opinion).
110. Graham, 560 U.S. at 59 ('The Court's cases addressing the proportionality of sen-
tences fall within two general classifications. The first involves challenges to the length of
term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular case. The second com-
prises cases in which the Court implements the proportionality standard by certain cate-
gorical restrictions on the death penalty.").
111. Id. at 88-89 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (pointing to the similarities between a sen-
tence of life imprisonment and imposition of the death penalty).
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degree."'112 Justice Thomas's opinion contained the language that
may become most cited from the case: 'Death is different' no
longer." 3
Two years later, the Court solidified the jurisprudential expan-
sion in Miller v. Alabama. Miller involved two cases, both ad-
dressing juveniles who were fourteen years old at the time of
their offenses and who had been given mandatory sentences of
life without the possibility of parole."4 Those sentences were non-
discretionary or, as Justice Kagan's majority opinion put it,
"[s]tate law mandated that each juvenile die in prison even if a
judge or jury would have thought that his youth and its attendant
characteristics, along with the nature of his crime, made a lesser
sentence (for example, life with the possibility of parole) more ap-
propriate.""' The question before the Court was whether the sen-
tences violated the Eighth Amendment's proportionality limita-
tions.1' 6 Like in Graham, however, rather than apply just the
narrow proportionality principles previously applicable to non-
capital cases, the Court applied the "evolving standards of decen-
cy" jurisprudence previously reserved for capital cases as well as
a narrow proportionality review."' Combining the two lines of ju-
risprudence, the Court ruled not that the juvenile sentences were
per se unconstitutional, but rather that individualized determina-
tions of the propriety of the sentences are mandated where a ju-
venile is given a sentence of life without the possibility of pa-
role.""
112. Id. at 89-90 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294
(1983)).
113. Id. at 103 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272
(1980)) ("[Tlhe bright line the Court drew between two penalties has for many hears
served as the principal justification for the Court's willingness to reject democratic choices
regarding the death penalty. Today's decision eviscerated that distinction. 'Death is differ-
ent' no longer.... The Court's departure from the 'death is different' distinction is espe-
cially mystifying when one considers how long it has resisted crossing that divide. Indeed,
for a time the Court declined to apply proportionality principles to noncapital sentences at
all, emphasizing that 'a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of imprison-
ment, no matter how long."') (citations omitted).
114. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (consolidated opinion). Miller was consolidated with Jack-
son v. Hobbs for argument and opinion. As a standard, reference to Miller v. Alabama re-
fers to both cases.
115. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
116. Id. at 2460.
117. Id. at 2466-67, 78.
118. Id. at 2467-68.
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In the short time since the decisions in Graham and Miller,
scholars, courts, and practitioners have grappled with the impli-
cations of the clear expansion of Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence."' Though the full implications of the cases have yet to be
felt, discussion of the extent of the shift has been robust, with
scholars and advocates analyzing the potential areas of impact.
Scholars have surmised that the areas likely impacted range from
the traditional Eighth Amendment area of prison conditions120 to
the entire area of juvenile law.'2' Despite a lack of consensus as to
the areas into which the new Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
will expand, it is clear that the cap is off the bottle and the Eighth
Amendment has grown significantly outside its prior confines.
22
Important to the doctrinal shift and notable for the analysis set
forth in this article, the Court has indicated that community val-
ues, represented by the Eighth Amendment's evolving standards
of decency jurisprudence, have a role to play even outside the cap-
ital arena.
The next section discusses a parallel jurisprudential shift, that
of the expansion of the jury's role in criminal cases. The potential
implications of these changes upon trials of protesters will be dis-
cussed later in the article.
B. The Sharpening Role of the Jury
The other area of great jurisprudential shift in the criminal
arena since the turn of the millennium has been in the interpre-
tation of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision.123 The right
119. See, e.g. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death and Youth: Now the Twain
Should Meet, 46 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 29, 53 (2013) (arguing for the expansion of "death is
different" jurisprudence into the juvenile arena and that "if 'death is different,' children
are different too") (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470); Berry, The Mandate of Miller, supra
note 96, at 338-39 (2014) (arguing for an extension of "death is different" protections to all
cases involving the possibility of a "death-in-custody" sentence in which the sentence ex-
ceeds the offender's life expectancy).
120. See Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 50, at 416.
121. loana Tchoukleva, Children Are Different: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and
Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 92, 106 (2013).
122. Craig S. Lerner, Sentenced to Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the Coming Wave
of Eighth Amendment Cases, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 39 (2012) ("The larger question
raised by Graham and Miller is whether the Court, having twice invalidated noncapital
sentences, is prepared to embark upon an invigorated Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
.... .).
123. The Sixth Amendment provides:
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to a jury emerges from deep in our legal roots, with its constitu-
tional foundation predating even the Sixth Amendment.'24 The ex-
tent of power that the Framers of the Constitution intended to
rest with the jury is robustly debated.'25 Beyond significant dis-
pute, however, is the importance of the jury's role as "guard
against a spirit of oppression and tyranny .... 26 The importance
of this function has been echoed by the Supreme Court in opin-
ions calling the jury "fundamental to the American scheme of jus-
tice" and of "surpassing importance.'27
In practice, however, many commentators have noted the irony
that the jury's rhetorical power was accompanied for many years
by a constriction of its actual authority.121 Prior to the Sixth
Amendment's recent expansion, the jury's role in a non-capital
case was rigidly confined to that of "fact-finder" during proceed-
ings on guilt.129 In the death penalty arena, the Court for years re-
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
124. Even before enactment of the Sixth Amendment, Article III of the Constitution
embodied the requirement that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes... shall be by Jury .... " U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; see also Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 57, at 34 (stat-
ing that the criminal jury was put into place by the Constitution to act as a check on the
government well before Sixth Amendment guarantees were enacted).
125. Compare, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 21
(1941) (arguing that the First Amendment was intended to eliminate the crime of sedition
and prevent criminal prosecutions for criticism of the government), with, e.g., LEONARD W.
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY, at vii (1960) (claiming that the Constitution drew upon theory justifying gov-
ernment suppression of seditious speech).
126. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th ed., 1873));
FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The friends and adversaries of the plan of the
convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon trial by
jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former regarded it as
a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free gov-
ernment.").
127. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1967).
128. See, e.g., T. Ward Frampton, Note, The Uneven Bulwark: How (and Why) Criminal
Jury Trial Rates Vary by State, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 183, 186 (2012) ("If the right to a jury
trial is 'the spinal column of American democracy,' this Comment identifies a severe case
of scoliosis.").
129. Benjamin F. Diamond, The Sixth Amendment: Where Did the Jury Go? Florida's
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jected the argument that the Constitution required a jury to
make the final decision imposing the death penalty on a defend-
ant.3 ' Instead, a judge, or panel of judges, could decide them-
selves the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors and
even override the jury's decision that a life sentence was most ap-
propriate. Until 2000, the Court's position on the Sixth Amend-
ment was that, while it guaranteed the right to a jury trial at the
conviction stage, "[tihe Sixth Amendment never has been thought
to guarantee a right to a jury determination of [the appropriate
punishment].""'
The harbinger of the Sixth Amendment revolution was a foot-
note, technically dicta, in a fairly ordinary carjacking case in
which the judge found "serious bodily injury" and increased the
defendant's sentence.3 ' That case, Jones v. United States, upend-
ed business as usual in sentencing courts by raising the specter of
a constitutional problem with judicial determination of sentenc-
ing facts.'33 A year later, significant upheaval began with Appren-
di v. New Jersey's holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial requires that, except for prior convictions, "any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."'34 Summoning the historical role of the jury, Jus-
tice Stevens, writing for the Court, noted that the Sixth Amend-
ment constitutionalized the core functions of eighteenth century
Flawed Sentencing in Death Penalty Cases, 55 FLORIDA L. REV. 905, 911 (2003).
130. Id. at 912-13.
131. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1983).
132. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243, n.6 (1999) (containing the language
that would become the holding in Apprendi: "[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.").
See, e.g., G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Death of Death-Qualification, 59 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 87, 88 (2008) ("[Tjhe Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence is in the midst
of an originalist revolution. Starting with Jones v. United States and continuing through
Apprendi v. New Jersey, Ring v. Arizona, Blakely v. Washington, and Crawford v. Wash-
ington, the Court stands poised to refasten Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to its histori-
cal underpinnings.").
133. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 239 (noting the Court's concerns in the context of applying
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance).
134. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Justice O'Connor, in her dis-
sent wrote: 'Today, in what will surely be remembered as a watershed change in constitu-
tional law, the Court imposes as a constitutional rule the principle it first identified in
Jones." Id. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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juries.'35 Primary among those functions, according to the Court,
was the jury's role as bulwark against governmental overreach-
ing.
136
Importantly, Apprendi is more than a decision about jury sen-
tencing. The case also prioritizes individual decision making in a
manner analogous to that required in the capital arena.37 Though
the case at first appears to involve a tension between the judici-
ary and the jury, the true impact of Apprendi has been to shift
the balance of authority for determinations of criminal sentencing
from the legislature, via generalized pronouncements, to individ-
ualized conclusions by a jury. ' Since Apprendi, sentence en-
hancements can be imposed only when accompanied by individu-
alized jury determinations.'39 Jones, Apprendi, and the line of
cases that followed signaled a victory for individualization over
the structured, determinate sentencing that had previously been
paramount.'40 Notably, the arguments on either side of the Ap-
prendi debate mirror the tension seen in capital sentencing be-
tween individualized sentences and uniformity.'
135. See id. at 479 (focusing on legal history and concluding that the criminal law
tended to be sanction-specific, giving the judge little discretion).
136. Id. at 477 ("[OJur recognition of these principles extends down centuries into the
common law. '[To guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,'
and 'as the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties."') (quoting 2 J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th ed. 1873)).
137. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976); see also supra Part
I.B.
138. See Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 50, at 414.
139. For a brilliant article addressing Apprendi, Miller, and individualized determina-
tions of culpability, see id. ("Individualization and moral appropriateness figured critically
in the Apprendi line as well, although it takes some work to see how.").
140. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27, 244 (2005) (applying the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial to the federal sentencing guidelines and invalidating the
mandatory nature of the guidelines' sentencing enhancements); Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 303-05 (2004) (holding that a state trial court's sentencing of defendant to a
sentence above the statutory maximum on the basis of the judge's finding violated the de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury); see also Vikram David Amar, Imple-
menting an Historical Vision of the Jury in an Age of Administrative Factfinding and Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 291, 293 (2005) ('"The basic constitutional vision
underlying the Booker/Blakely/Apprendi line of cases focuses on the centrality of the in-
stitution of the jury in our system of government of the people, by the people, and for the
people.").
141. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 556-57, (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing the prac-
tical aspects of the shift from general legislative determinations to individualized jury de-
terminations, Justice Breyer notes that "[tihere are, to put it simply, far too many poten-
tially relevant sentencing factors to permit submission of all (or even many) of them to a
jury"); see also Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 50, at 415.
[Vol. 50:737
PROTEST IS DIFFERENT
As with the shift in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, discus-
sion has been robust as scholars, courts, and practitioners grap-
ple with the implications of the changing Sixth Amendment ju-
risprudence. Areas that some scholars have suggested will need
to significantly change in order to accommodate the newfound
power of the jury include restitution hearings,42 parole violation
proceedings,'43 and all criminal sentencing proceedings.4
Death penalty jurisprudence, once an island unto itself, is
evolving, and its reach is expanding as the partition between cap-
ital and non-capital offenses erodes. Though the jurisprudential
shifts discussed above resonate in a number of legal contexts, the
shifts are especially important for criminal trials of protesters,
and it is to the topic of civil disobedience where the article turns
next.
III. CIVILLY DISOBEDIENT PROTEST Is DIFFERENT
This section examines civilly disobedient protest, including its
societal values and disruptive costs as well as the tension be-
tween these competing values when a civilly disobedient protester
is charged with an offense. The first subsection summarizes the
legal and social underpinnings of protest, focusing on the tension
between protest and the rule of law and discussing the arguments
both in favor of permitting robust civil disobedience and for limit-
ing the role of protest. The second subsection explores the impli-
cations of these fundamental tensions, including how community
norms and values play a role in determining the criminal culpa-
bility of civilly disobedient protesters.
142. See James Barta, Guarding the Rights of the Accused and Accuser: The Jury's Role
in Awarding Criminal Restitution Under the Sixth Amendment, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463,
464 (2014) (arguing for reexamination, in light of the expansion of Sixth Amendment ju-
risprudence, of the determination that a restitution determination does not require a ju-
ry).
143. Scott H. Ikeda, Probation Revocations As Delayed Dispositional Departures: Why
Blakely v. Washington Requires Jury Trials at Probation Violation Hearings, 24 L. &
INEQ. 157, 158 (2006) (arguing that "the next logical step" in emerging case law is the
right to a jury at probation revocation hearings).
144. See Iontcheva, supra note 71, 314-15 (making the case for jury sentencing in all
criminal cases).
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A. Protest's Tension with the Rule of Law
Merriam-Webster defines the term "civil disobedience" as the
"refusal to obey governmental demands or commands esp[ecially]
as a nonviolent and usu[ally] collective means of forcing conces-
sions from the government."'45 Though definitions of civil disobe-
dience vary, this article adopts a narrow definition, confining civil
disobedience to a violation of law that is open, public, non-violent,
intended to effectuate social or political change, and directed at
the government.'46 Though a number of characteristics distin-
guish civil disobedience and non-protest criminal actions, perhaps
no difference is more important than the motivation underlying
the action. An act of civil disobedience is one "of conscience," mo-
tivated by a desire to communicate a need for social or political
change; it is this social benefit that is distinct from the motivation
behind general criminal acts. 147
Though civil disobedience and law have coexisted for as long as
the law has been around, their relationship is tense.'48 This ten-
145. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 226 (11th ed. 2003); see also United
States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 195-96 (9th Cir. 1991) ("As used in this opinion, 'civil diso-
bedience' is the willful violation of a law, undertaken for the purpose of social or political
protest.").
146. See Jessica L. West, Is Injustice Relevant? Narrative and Blameworthiness in Pro-
tester Trials, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 107, 114-15 (2013) (defining civil disobedience); see also
ROBERT T. HALL, THE MORALITY OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 50 (1971); Matthew R. Hall,
Guilty but Civilly Disobedient: Reconciling Civil Disobedience and the Rule of Law, 28
CARDOzO L. REV. 2083, 2087-89 (2007) [hereinafter Hall, Guilty but Civilly Disobedient];
Loesch, supra note 11, at 1095.
147. Hall, Guilty but Civilly Disobedient, supra note 146, at 2087-89; Daniel Mar-
kovits, Democratic Disobedience, 114 YALE L.J. 1897, 1898 (2005) ("[Civil] disobedience is
not guided by greed or self-dealing but by principal, and it is therefore not criminal in any
ordinary sense .... "). There are non-protest criminal actions that may be classified as so-
cially valuable, for example, if a stranded survivor of Hurricane Katrina takes provisions
from a market. Such situations of justification are often covered by the necessity defense,
which, though sometimes available thirty or forty years ago, is rarely permitted in con-
temporary civil disobedience trials. See William P. Quigley, The Necessity Defense in Civil
Disobedience Cases: Bring in the Jury, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 3, 5 (2003); Luke Shulman-
Ryan, Evidence-The Motion in Limine and the Marketplace of Ideas: Advocating for the
Availability of the Necessity Defense for Some of the Bay State's Civilly Disobedient, 27 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 299, 314-15, 317-18 (2005).
148. See Frances Olsen, Socrates on Legal Obligation: Legitimation Theory and Civil
Disobedience, 18 GA. L. REV. 929, 934 (1984) (relaying Professor A.D. Woozley's assertion
that, in the Apology, Socrates "both expresses ome pride in his own defiance [of the law]
and maintains that there can be a higher call than the call of human law"); see also A.
John Simmons, Disobedience and its Objects, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1805, 1809 n.23 (2010)
("[Clivil disobedience is as old as Antigone and Socrates .... ") (quoting HUGO ADAM
BEDAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 15 (1960)).
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sion between speech and resistance on the one hand and the nec-
essary law-abidingness of an orderly populace on the other has
been challenging to navigate. Despite these concerns, civil diso-
bedience in the United States enjoys a long history; one of the
founding principles of the republic was the right of citizens to de-
fy the laws of an oppressive political regime.' Though rule of law
principles may be dominant in other countries, "Americans accept
that civil disobedience has a legitimate if informal place in the po-
litical culture of their community.""'
Though embodied in our social discourse, civil disobedience is
not a recognized right in the U.S. Constitution."' Despite the ab-
sence of express constitutional protection, however, where protest
is engaged in for an expressive purpose, the act is protected under
the First Amendment."2 The relationship between protest and the
First Amendment has been described as one of complementary ef-
fects, with protest impacting the First Amendment, and the First
Amendment impacting protest.'
53
The need for a developed democratic system to tolerate some
protest may be clear, but the question of whether civil disobedi-
149. Loesch, supra note 11, at 1071-75.
150. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 105 (1985); see Bruce Ledewitz, Civil
Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amendment, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 67, 68 (1990)
[hereinafter Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions] ("[C]ivil disobedience... has be-
come an established part of American political life."); see also Loesch, supra note 11, at
1071-84 (discussing significant periods of civil disobedience in the United States including
the revolutionary period, slavery, women's suffrage, and civil rights).
151. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may
exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agree-
ment that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of gov-
ernmental affairs."). But see Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (rejecting the ar-
gument "that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional
right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please").
152. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. 1. Protest qualifies as speech under the First
Amendment when the action constitutes symbolic conduct with a communicative ele-
ment. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968); see also, Joshua Wald-
man, Symbolic Speech and Social Meaning, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1844, 1846-47 (1997).
153. See Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the
Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999, 1001 (1989) ('The disciplined peacefulness of
the civil rights activists and the underlying decency of their demands helped to create an
atmosphere conducive to judicial liberality. The result was not only a beneficial transfor-
mation in the substantive law of race relations, but also a blossoming of libertarian
themes in First Amendment jurisprudence. In the context of the First Amendment, as in
many other areas, the struggle for racial justice produced ramifications that extended far
beyond its point of origin. Once loosed, liberty, like equality, was an idea not easily cab-
ined.").
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ence plays a positive role is another issue altogether. Some schol-
ars argue that protest operates not merely as a counterbalance to
democratic society and its limitations, but enhances democratic
principles by correcting deficits that threaten the system."' Pro-
fessor Daniel Markovits analogizes the role of civil disobedience
to that of judicial review in that each, though fundamentally un-
democratic, enforces fundamental rights and protects minorities
within the majoritarian political system.'55 According to Mar-
kovits, even more than judicial review, civil disobedience is essen-
tial to offset democratic deficits by increasing citizen engagement
and popular dialogue."' Civil disobedience increases democratic
engagement by triggering reevaluation of issues that have been
given inadequate attention."7 Thus, Markovits sees civil disobedi-
ence as essential not just in societies with significant rights viola-
tions, but also in advanced democratic societies like the United
States where "democratic disobedience [is] an unavoidable, even
integral, part of a well-functioning democratic process.""8
Protest serves a variety of functions important to a healthy
democracy. Protest operates as a mechanism to circumvent politi-
cal and legal barriers to marginalized perspectives and to inject
dissenting perspectives into the public dialogue."' In this way, it
serves to allow issues that have been overlooked by the dominant
discourse to find their way onto the public agenda. In addition, by
providing a vehicle to raise dissenting opinions, civil disobedience
operates as a "firebreak," allowing marginalized political minori-
ties to express their dissent before that unrest boils over in more
154. Markovits, supra note 147, at 1900. Markovits distinguishes between types of pro-
test, separating those that enhance democratic dialogue about options from those that sti-
fle it. Id. at 1939-44.
155. Id. at 1929 ("In the one case, self-appointed protesters disobey democratically en-
acted laws; in the other, unelected and unaccountable judges strike them down."). Mar-
kovits is not the only scholar to recognize that civil disobedience serves important values
including free speech, protest, public debate, and the ability of citizens to challenge the
government.
156. Id. at 1904, 1940.
157. Id. at 1933.
158. Id. at 1936. According to Markovits, civil disobedience may be especially im-
portant in an established democracy since the power of the state is great, the ability to
change the laws is limited, and laws can easily become ossified. Id. at 1921-22, 1937.
159. See e.g., Loesch, supra note 11, at 1094 ("Civil disobedience speaks ... past the
bureaucracy .... ); Kevin H. Smith, Therapeutic Civil Disobedience: A Preliminary Explo-
ration, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 99, 130 (2000) ("[T]he civil disobedient has become pro-active by
taking steps designed to change her circumstances and destiny instead of passively being
at the mercies of others.").
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socially dangerous actions.6 ' Further, an expression of conviction
by a group of individuals can capture public attention, promote
debate, increase democratic engagement, and contribute to the
exchange of ideas.61 That civil disobedience serves these socially
beneficial functions is the reason a number of scholars consider
actions of protest to be an affirmative virtue in an established
democracy. 1
62
Not all of the impacts of civil disobedience are positive, howev-
er. Critics of civil disobedience point out that it exacts a social
toll, the cost of which is felt especially upon order and the rule of
law. 3 Perhaps most familiar to scholars, two former Supreme
Court Justices have publicly affirmed the primacy of the rule of
law over any benefits to be achieved by disobedience to criminal
proscriptions enacted lawfully.6 4 Justice Powell described the civ-
160. See Smith, supra note 159, at 131. ("Participation in an act of civil disobedience
may provide a vehicle by which the civil disobedient can release the frustration and simi-
lar emotions that arise from the situation which is the object of the protest. The act of civil
disobedience may provide the civil disobedient with the opportunity to communicate her
feelings, through signs, chanting, or singing; it permits the civil disobedient to 'tell off the
oppressors in an environment that is relatively safe.").
161. See Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, supra note 150, at 122-23 (1990);
Alicia A. D'Addario, Policing Protest: Protecting Dissent and Preventing Violence Through
First and Fourth Amendment Law, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 97, 103 (2006)
('Much of the progress toward social justice made over the past century has been associat-
ed with protest movements.").
162. See RICHARD DAGGER, CIVIC VIRTUES: RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND REPUBLICAN
LIBERALISM 14 (1997) ('fo be virtuous ... is to perform well a socially necessary or im-
portant role. This does not mean that the virtuous person must always go along with the
prevailing views or attitudes. On the contrary, Socrates and John Stuart Mill have per-
suaded many people to believe that questioning and challenging the prevailing views are
among the highest forms of virtue."); HOWARD ZINN, DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE:
CROSS-EXAMINING AMERICAN IDEOLOGY 123 (1990) ("Protest beyond the law is not a de-
parture from democracy; it is absolutely essential to it. It is a corrective to the sluggish-
ness of 'the proper channels,' a way of breaking through passages blocked by tradition and
prejudice. It is disruptive and troublesome, but it is a necessary disruption, a healthy
troublesomeness."); Phillip Lynch, Juries as Communities of Resistance: Eureka and the
Power of the Rabble, 27 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 83, 85 (2002) ("In forming a community of re-
sistance and achieving justice rather than following the law, [those who engage in civil
disobedience] ... contributeo to our advance towards civilisation.").
163. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 312 (rev. ed. 1999) ("[1]n a state of
near justice.., there is normally a duty (and for some also the obligation) to comply with
unjust laws .. "); see also Hall, Guilty but Civilly Disobedient, supra note 146, at 2131.
164. ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 19 (1968); Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 205, 208, 225
(1966). Powell wrote the article while serving as President of the American Bar Associa-
tion and before President Nixon appointed him to the United States Supreme Court. Id.
For a Supreme Court Justice with a very different opinion on protest, see WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 3 (1969) ("All dissenters are protected by the First
2016]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
il disobedience of the 1960s as "heresy which could weaken the
foundations of our system of government."'65 His primary con-
cerns rested with the potential for violence and civil unrest and
the erosion of the rule of law."' Similarly, in 1968 Justice Fortas
published a book on the role of civil disobedience in which he set
forth his belief that "[elach of us owes a duty of obedience to law"
as a "moral as well as a legal imperative."'67 Granting any legal
leniency or recognition to protesters would establish a jurispru-
dential paradigm that permits "legal illegality" and incentivize a
practice that disrupts societal order.66
In sum, civilly disobedient protest holds a complex place in the
social and legal structures of the United States. The positive val-
ue of dissent and protest exists in deep tension with the rule of
law and the social contract that demands obedience even in the
face of individual disagreement. In trials of civilly disobedient
protesters, these tensions are paramount. The next section ex-
plores the importance of a jury determination of culpability in
light of the complex and competing values underlying protester
trials.
B. The Role of the Community in Evaluating Civil Disobedience
The tensions between protest and obedience are particularly
acute when a civilly disobedient protester is facing criminal pros-
ecution. By definition, an act of civil disobedience is the inten-
tional violation of a properly promulgated and presumptively val-
id law.9 Equally inherent, however, is both that the motivation
of the civilly disobedient protester is societal rather than personal
gain and that the action itself, and the right to engage in the act,
provide a public benefit. During proceedings in which a civilly
Amendment.").
165. Powell, supra note 164, at 205.
166. Id. at 229, 231 (raising concerns about "street mob[s] and massive civil disobedi-
ence" and noting that "[t]he ultimate danger is to the rule of law and the framework of
government which sustains it").
167. FORTAS, supra note 164, at 231. See Bruce Ledewitz, Perspectives on the Law of the
American Sit-In, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 499, 505 (1995).
168. See Hall, Guilty but Civilly Disobedient, supra note 146, at 2083-84, 2131; Powell,
supra note 164, at 231.
169. The definition of civil disobedience adopted here is confined to action that is open,
public, non-violent, intended to effectuate social or political change, and directed at the
government. See supra Part III.A.
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disobedient protester is criminally prosecuted, these competing
values collide. This section discusses the role that community
norms and values should play in resolving these fundamental
conflicts.
Despite the debate over the appropriate place of morality in the
law generally,70 it is widely accepted that criminal verdicts oper-
ate as moral statements of community opprobrium. Standing on
the cusp of legal realism, Oliver Wendell Holmes noted that "[t]he
law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its histo-
ry is the history of the moral development of the race.""' Concepts
of moral condemnation and blame run throughout criminal juris-
prudence and, as some scholars have noted, societal condemna-
tion is what distinguishes criminal from civil liability.172 Noted le-
gal scholar Henry Hart acknowledged that imposition of a
criminal sanction involves a determination "that the violation
was blameworthy and, hence, deserving of the moral condemna-
170. The debate is illustrated in recent Supreme Court opinions which address the con-
stitutionality of the legislation of morality and the propriety of judicial judgments of mo-
rality. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the
Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be 'drawn for the purpose of
disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."'), with Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,
494 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[B]eware the word 'moral' when used in an opinion of
this Court. This word is a vessel of nearly infinite capacity-just as it may allow the sen-
tencer to express benevolence, it may allow him to cloak latent animus. A judgment that
some will consider a 'moral response' may secretly be based on caprice or even outright
prejudice.").
171. Holmes, supra note 31, at 992. The quote is from an address delivered by Holmes
at Boston University School of Law in 1897. Id. at 991. For a discussion of Holmes's im-
pact on challenging natural law theories, see Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POLY 171 (2008).
172. See Hart, supra note 10, at 404; Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Con-
ceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 352-53 (1996) ("Because
criminal law expresses condemnation, what a political community punishes, and how se-
verely, tell a story about whose interests are valued and how much."); Kim, supra note 31,
at 216 ('The moral judgment of the community is reflected in the culpability assigned to
the crime."); Myers, supra note 70, at 140 n. 10 (identifying multiple sources discussing the
criminal law's moral underpinnings); Paul H. Robinson, Supreme Court Review-
Foreword: The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blameless Offenders, 83 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693, 694 (1993) ("Conventional lay wisdom holds that criminal liability
and criminal commitment are different from civil liability and civil commitment in that
the former generally are thought to reflect moral blameworthiness deserving condemna-
tion and punishment."). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?:
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV.
193 (1991) (discussing the encroachment of criminal law into areas traditionally viewed as
civil).
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tion of the community."'' Hart's position echoed that of sociologist
Emile Durkheim, who believed that attaching blame for a crime
performs the necessary social functions of allowing members of
society to affirm the society's collective values, to express their
disapproval of acts that offend these values, and to foster social
cohesion.' In fact, blameworthiness is so critical that courts will
infer the requirement even where a criminal statute does not ex-
pressly provide for it.
17
1
Though civil disobedience necessarily involves the violation of
laws, society's response is not always to impose the same sanc-
tions that would be imposed upon a non-civilly disobedient crimi-
nal defendant. The individual's motivation is one area of inquiry
that is critical to a determination of the extent of an actor's
blameworthiness, an area in which civilly disobedient protesters
distinguish themselves from non-protester defendants.76 Motiva-
tion is critical because, as studies have shown, judgments of
blame vary depending on the reason for the action. We are more
inclined to blame a transgressor with a bad motive than we are
one with an altruistic motive.17 7 Also important to determinations
of blameworthiness are perceptions as to whether an individual
has a good or bad character and the motivation underlying an ac-
tion. ' Accounting for this social science, civilly disobedient pro-
173. Hart, supra note 10, at 412. "What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction
and all that distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the judgment of community condemnation
which accompanies and justifies its imposition." Id. at 404; see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 156 (1987) ("Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more purpose-
ful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more severe-
ly it ought to be punished."); Binder Guyora, The Rhetorical Motive and Intent 6 BUFFALO
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2002) (discussing the historical and theoretical importance of "mor-
al wrongfulness" in criminal law); Myers, supra note 70, at 138-39 ("[T]he defining char-
acteristic of the criminal law is moral condemnation.").
174. ]EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 105, 108-09 (George Simp-
son trans. 1960) (1933).
175. See John Shephard Wiley Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability
in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1053 (1999) (noting that the Su-
preme Court "will interpret a statute to require the government to prove moral blamewor-
thiness .... [Tihe Court has been taking it for granted that Congress means to reserve
criminal blame for the blameworthy.").
176. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 172, at 352-53 (referring to this inquiry as one
into "what a person's actions mean"). I discuss concepts of motivation and their relation to
blameworthiness in West, supra note 146, at 114-15, 137-40.
177. See, e.g., Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 368, 376-77 (1992); see also Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral
Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255, 263 (2012).
178. Nadler & McDonnell, supra note 177, at 273 ("[B]ad moral character influences
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testers are likely to be viewed as more or less blameworthy and
criminally culpable depending how one views their underlying
motivation, as well as the related implications of their action.9
In addition, consideration of the place of protest may impact
one's perspective as to the culpability of a protester. The recent
example of civilly disobedient protester Tim DeChristopher-the
subject of a feature length film, Bidder 70-is illustrative of a
protester viewed as more culpable than a non-protesting defend-
ant who committed the same action. ' DeChristopher is an activ-
ist who in 2008 almost accidentally found himself inside a federal
auction for oil and gas leases; he subsequently bid on and won
nine auctioned oil and gas leases.' However, DeChristopher nev-
er intended to pay for the leases, which constituted a federal of-
fense.1 s2 In sentencing him to a shockingly long two years impris-
onment, the federal judge found support in both DeChristopher's
lack of remorse and his public statements in support of civil diso-
bedience.'3 The judge indicated that DeChristopher's statements
in support of protest and civil disobedience, far more than his ac-
tions, justified his prosecution and the harsh sentence. 184 The fed-
eral appellate court affirmed the propriety of aggravating
DeChristopher's sentence by relying on the same justification.8 '
perceptions of blame, responsibility, causation, and the like .... ").
179. See id. at 292 ("[OJur experiments [imply] .... that an actor's motive (along with
its implicit suggestions about moral character) can strongly influence inferences about
causation, intent, and blame.").
180. BIDDER 70 (GAGE & GAGE PRODUCTIONS 2012).
181. See Frederick M. MacDonald, Utah, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 661, 664 (2012).
182. Id. at 666-67. The trial judge refused to allow DeChristepher to present evidence
that by the time of DeChristopher's conviction and owing to a change in President, all of
the leases sold at the auction had been invalidated. Id. at 665.
183. Brandon Loomis, DeChristopher Sentenced to Prison, 26 Protesters Arrested, SALT
LAKE TRIB. (July 27, 2011, 2:47 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/printfriendly.php?id=522
63987&itype=cmsid; see MacDonald, supra note 181, at 665. DeChristopher's judgment of
conviction and sentence can be found at Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v.
DeChristopher, No. 2:09-cr-000183-001, 2011 WL 3269197 (D. Utah July 28, 2011).
184. Loomis, supra note 183 (according to the presiding Judge, "[t]he offense itself,
with all apologies to people actually in the auction itself, wasn't that bad"); see MacDonald,
supra note 181, at 667.
185. United States v. DeChristopher, 695 F.3d 1082, 1098 (10th Cir. 2012) (dismissing
DeChristopher's argument that the district court violated the First Amendment by consid-
ering his public statements when imposing sentencing). But see United States v. Rosen-
berg, 806 F.2d 1169, 1179 (3d Cir.1986) ("[Tihe imposition of a sentence on the basis of a
defendant's beliefs would violate the [F]irst [Ajmendment's guarantees."); United States v.
Lemon, 723 F.2d 922, 938 (D.C. Cir.1983) (finding a court may not constitutionally impose
a criminal sentence "based to any degree on activity or beliefs protected by the [F]irst
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When a civilly disobedient protester is criminally prosecuted, a
balancing of competing values can happen at many stages and
can lead to either over-enforcement or under-enforcement of the
law as compared with non-protest related crimes. Under-
enforcement of criminal violations, on behalf of protesters or oth-
ers, is neither uncommon nor inappropriate.'86 In all criminal cas-
es, police and prosecutors use their discretion to decide whether
to fully and vigorously enforce violations.17 Conferring significant
discretion on police and prosecutors recognizes that not all viola-
tions of law implicate the requisite culpability for criminal convic-
tion."88 Under-enforcement of criminal laws may reflect the recog-
nition that "principles of democratic accountability sometimes
require law enforcement to make room for public deviance."' 9
While police sometimes under-enforce against civilly disobedient
protesters, police may also develop harsh strategies, including
over-enforcement, to discourage or minimize the potential for pro-
test.'9° Prosecutors may also use their discretionary power to over-
enforce.' Once made, these enforcement decisions are difficult to
monitor, hidden from public view, and thus employed without
significant accountability.
192
[A]mendment").
186. For a discussion of the area in which the government under-enforces criminal
laws, see Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1743 (2006)
("[U]nderenforcement [may be] a sign of truly responsive government, one that recognizes
that not all laws deserve to be enforced all of the time and that principles of democratic
accountability sometimes require law enforcement o make room for public deviance.").
187. See id. at 1743.
188. Id.
189. Id.; see Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Govern-
ment in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 355 (2011) ("[T]hese actions can be
understood as efforts to trigger dormant institutional hydraulics that help limited gov-
ernment acknowledge and address areas of social harm and discontent.").
190. See Robin Lipp, Protest Policing in New York City: Balancing Safety and Expres-
sion, 9 HARV. L. & POLy REV. 275, 276 (2015) ("Current policing strategies focus on mini-
mizing suspected harms [of protest] but think little of facilitating [its] benefits."); Joshua
Rissman, Put It on Ice: Chilling Free Speech at National Conventions, 27 L. & INEQ. 413,
413-14 (2009) (explaining that some police "have taken extreme measures to curtail dis-
sent"). See generally Alafair Burke, Policing Protestors and Discretion, 40 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 999, 999-1002, 1021 (2013) (discussing a number of examples of police treating indi-
viduals harshly in retaliation for their engagement in protests).
191. For criticism of the way in which prosecutorial discretion is utilized generally, see
Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 50, at 409, 424.
192. See id. at 424; Stuntz, supra note 63, at 522 ("[N]o one knows how any given crim-
inal statute is enforced in any given state. Even in a single locality, only a few cops and a
handful of prosecutors may know.").
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Notably missing from the discretion in enforcing protest law
violations, however, is a voice that articulates community values
and norms.'93 In the death penalty arena, juries must undertake,
individually in each case, to determine the moral culpability of
the defendant and to balance the culpability with all of the other
factors mitigating the sentence.' The foundational pillars under-
lying the requirement of a moral balancing were recently reaf-
firmed, strengthened, and expanded outside of the capital arena,
as discussed previously. These pillars affirm the importance of
the community voice as essential to weighing complex values.'95
Criminal prosecutions of civilly disobedient protesters, where the
acts of political conscience are grounded in a desire for societal
improvement, represent an area in which it may be especially ap-
propriate to apply the recently endorsed expansive concepts of
community input. The next section explores the implications of
recognizing civilly disobedient protest as different and permitting
jury involvement in determinations as to the culpability of pro-
testers.
C. The Implications of Recognizing Protest as Different
In light of the expanding jurisprudence recognizing the role of
the jury as community conscience, this article posits that society,
represented by the jury, should be able to assess the criminal cul-
pability of the civil disobedient protester.196 This section addresses
the nuts and bolts of what that evaluation would look like as well
as some of the likely implications of implementing an explicit
community determination of culpability into protester trials.
As with the weighing required in a capital case, an ultimate
finding of moral culpability should underlie a determination of
culpability in a protest case. Similar to the mechanisms employed
in capital cases, juries should be permitted to consider an array of
evidence that might tend to mitigate culpability when evaluating
193. See supra Part I.C.
194. See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[T]he individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty is a moral
inquiry into the culpability of the defendant . .
195. See supra Part II.C.
196. See Cahill, supra note 70, at 95 ("[Tjhe basic justifications for having a right to a
jury trial always have relied in part on a sense that the jury is a proper and fair arbiter of
a criminal defendant's moral blameworthiness.").
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the conduct of civilly disobedient protesters.197 In order to make a
determination of blameworthiness, the jury would need to consid-
er both the social costs and any social benefits of the action. Im-
portant to this consideration might be evidence as to the protest-
er's goals, other unsuccessful legal attempts made by the
protester establishing need for the action, the communicative
value of the action, the social costs of the action, and the extent to
which the costs could have been mitigated but were not. Ulti-
mately, the jury would make a determination as to whether the
social value of the action outweighs the costs such that the pro-
tester is insufficiently blameworthy to be held criminally liable.98
If the jury finds that the protester's actions are insufficiently cul-
pable and that the moral balance belongs on the side of the pro-
tester, the jury should be permitted to operate as a veto to a crim-
inal conviction.199
Implementation of this new evaluative framework would have
a number of positive benefits. Perhaps chief among these would
be an increase in democratic participation by society, with the ju-
ry as society's proxy. Not only does peaceful protest increase so-
cial dialogue, but the participation of the jury in the process of
evaluating the value of the protest-as-speech also creates its own
form of democratic speech."0 The jury would be empowered to
participate in a vigorous debate as to the important values and
norms at issue in the trial. A related benefit would be to increase
dialogue between protestors, the government, and the communi-
ty."' For example, if a jury determined that a civilly disobedient
197. This article proposes that this evaluation is imperative only where the action
meets the narrow definition of civil disobedience, meaning that the action must be open,
public, nonviolent, intended to effectuate social or political change, and directed at the
government. See supra Part III.A.
198. This standard is similar to that of a necessity or choice of evils defense in criminal
law. See Stephen S. Schwartz, Is There a Common Law Necessity Defense in Federal Crim-
inal Law?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1259, 1260-61 (2008). Generally, courts do not allow either
defenses in civil disobedience cases. See Loesch, supra note 11, at 1098.
199. See Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 50, at 408-09 (discussing juries as critical
"vetogates" to criminal prosecution). For an article proposing that a verdict of censure
should be required in all criminal trials, see Myers, supra note 70, at 138 (2009).
200. The concept of "ideal speech situations" as promoting democracy comes from Pro-
fessor Jenia Iontcheva. See Iontcheva, supra note 71, at 340-41 (discussing jury delibera-
tions as the epitome of an ideal speech situation).
201. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 172, at 352 (stating that what society chooses
to punish "tell[s] a story about whose interests are valued and how much"); see also Myers,
supra note 70, at 148.
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protester was not culpable, the signal to the government would be
that the community believed the issue important and the value of
the action high. Such a verdict might indicate broad popular be-
lief that the government action was worth protesting. Similarly, a
verdict of conviction would indicate to protesters that the mes-
sage or tactics were too socially costly or that they were not find-
ing broad support. In addition, protesters planning actions would
be incentivized to structure their action so as to appeal to the
community and to promote public benefit. Since social cost will
also be part of the ultimate evaluation, the test will nudge pro-
testers to consider and reduce the social cost of their actions. Fi-
nally, given that the social balancing test would only be available
to protesters who engage in the actions that meet a narrow defi-
nition of civil disobedience, the action would also encourage pro-
testers toward non-violence in all actions.
Not all of the implications of the incorporation of community-
focused procedures would be positive. Indeed, proposing the adop-
tion of a test from capital jurisprudence is in itself a red flag sig-
naling the potential for procedural difficulties.0 2 Trials in which
the jury is permitted to consider the social costs and benefits of a
protester action would look quite different from current proceed-
ings; notably, the change would increase the length and complexi-
ty of these trials, burdening trial court, and reducing the efficien-
cy of judicial administration. In light of current burdens on trial
courts, this might be a significant cost.20 3 In addition, some com-
mentators will have concerns that juries are unprepared for such
a complex balancing of emotionally charged material and that we
should discourage verdicts based on moral determinations rather
than strict legal standards.0 4 Another critique might be that legal
202. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) ("[Tlhere is no perfect procedure
.... .).
203. See Thomas H. Douthat, A Comparative Analysis of Efforts to Improve Judicial
Efficiency and Reduce Delay at the Local and State Level, 77 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 931, 931
(2008); Micheal Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition
Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 814, 818 (2000); Margo Schalanger, What We Know
and What We Should Know About American Trial Trends, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 35, 40-41
(2006).
204. See, e.g., Kenworthey Bilz, We Don't Want to Hear It: Psychology, Literature and
the Narrative Model of Judging, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 429, 486 (2010) (presenting a case
against inclusionary narrative in trials in lieu of "procedural and substantive legal rules"
that function to "filter out narratives" that should be "rightly banished"); see also Kahan &
Nussbaum, supra note 172, at 273-74 (discussing the struggle with the role of emotion in
criminal law).
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procedures should strictly control the narratives permitted to be
presented at trial precisely because juries can and will be per-
suaded by the moral power of some arguments.15 Finally, an ac-
quittal under these standards might look similar to jury nullifica-
tion, which, though a structural right belonging to the jury, is
quite disfavored by courts.2 °6
Though the concerns are significant, they can be rebutted.
Studies tend to indicate that juries can effectively grapple with
multiple emotional perspectives.2 7 In a similar vein, despite in-
structions tailored to ensure that jurors follow legal precepts in-
stead of emotional impulses, jurors already attempt to conform
their verdicts less to legal formulae than to their own sense of
justice.28 Likewise, jury nullification may be less of a concern
than courts fear.2 9 Finally, as for efficiency, despite the likelihood
that these trials will be significantly more cumbersome than cur-
rent trials of protesters, "solicitude for efficient judicial admin-
istration must sometimes give way to the need to protect the
rights of defendants.2 10 In sum, the potential benefits of import-
ing into trials of civilly disobedient protesters the concepts of
community input emerging from the capital arena outweigh those
costs. Expansion of developments in the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments into the context proposed here is a natural juris-
prudential development that has the benefit of recognizing the
distinction between civilly disobedient protesters and non-
protester criminal defendants.
205. Bilz, supra note 204, at 430 ("[The narrative model demands that we refuse to
hear the stories of those being judged when doing so might lead us to exonerate, or even
just empathize, when we ought not.").
206. Andrew J. Parmenter, Nullifying the Jury: "The Judicial Oligarchy" Declares War
on Jury Nullification, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 417 (2007).
207. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 172, at 273; Myers, supra note 70, at 172 (ad-
dressing, and refuting, potential claims of jury confusion in the case of jury determinations
of censure).
208. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 165 (Little,
Brown & Co. 1971) (1966) (noting that jurors often surrender to their sentiments regard-
ing the case); Dan Simon, More Problems with Criminal Trials: The Limited Effectiveness
of Legal Mechanisms, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 174 (2012) ("Jury instructions are
often complex, couched in alien terminology, and demanding of unfamiliar and even im-
probable mental exercises.").
209. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 208, at 165.
210. United States v. Jackson, 562 F.2d 789, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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CONCLUSION
Capital jurisprudence is no longer a silo. The recent expansion
of two foundational jurisprudential pillars underlying death pen-
alty procedures affirm the role of the jury and the importance of a
community voice in moral determinations of culpability. Though
the interests that compete in the capital arena are unique, the
values underlying acts of civil disobedience are similar in depth
and complexity to the values underlying the individualization and
community conscience requirements in capital proceedings. The
principles and procedures employed in the capital arena thus of-
fer important guidance for criminal prosecutions involving civilly
disobedient protesters. Within the vortex of competing values
that exist when a civilly disobedient protester is criminally prose-
cuted for an act of protest, the voice of the community has a criti-
cal and irreplaceable role, and only the jury can adequately give
voice to community norms and values. Thus, in criminal prosecu-
tions of protesters, society, represented by the jury, should evalu-
ate on a case-by-case basis whether the individual action offends
collective values sufficiently to warrant the community condem-
nation implicit in a criminal conviction.
20161

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND
LAW REVIEW
EDITORIAL BOARD
JOSEPH SZESKO
Allen Chair Editor
P. THOMAS DISTANIsLAO, III
Editor-in-Chief
JENNIFER WONG
Executive Editor
STEVEN LIPPMAN
Managing Editor
JASON HODGE
Senior Notes & Comments Editor
MANuscRIrPTs EDITORS
JEREMY BAKER BROCKENBROUGH LAMB
RYAN CHARLES SPERAY JAMES STEINER
KRISTEN ZEGEER
ARTICLES EDITORS
DAVID BERRY AMY BRAUN
SHANNAN FITZGERALD BENJAMIN JOHNSON
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS
ARTICLEs & ComENTS EDITORS
JACOB GLASSER CHRISTOPHER KEEGAN
GORDON PHILLIPS
ONLINE EDITION EDITOR
CARTER NICHOLS
DANIEL PARK
HOLLY WILSON
BARRETT ENIX
ZACK MACDONALD
REILLY MOORE
Liz TYLER
SENIOR STAFF
ALEXANDER BOYD
JONATHAN HAIST
LUKE BRESNAHAN
JOHN JAY HAROOTUNIAN
SARAH ASHLEY BARNETr
ERYN BERQUIST
AMANDA BIRD
MALLORY BRENNAN
CLAY CAMPBELL
ALEXANDRA COOK
BRET DANIEL
RACHEL DEGRABA
ANGILEE DIMARTINO
CHRIS DOYLE
STAFF
ALEXANDER FRASER
JAMES GIUDICE
HUNTER GLENN
REBECCA JENNINGS
DUSTIN KNIGHT
KATHERINE LEHNEN
SYLVIA MACON
ALEXANDER R. McDANIEL
MICAYLEE NOREEN
KERRIGAN O'MALLEY
JOHN O'MALLEY
LAUREN PENNINGTON
KAITLYN POTTER
MEGAN RIORDAN
STEPHANIE SERHAN
CHELSEA SHRADER
KAITLYN WEST
ERIN WHELAN
RACHEL PATRICIA WILLER
JOHN G. DOUGLASS
CARL W. TOBIAS
Faculty Advisors
GLENICE B. COOMBS
Legal Publication
Coordinator
VOLUME 50 2015-2016
JOHN J. HOGAN
Annual Survey Editor
ANN ELIZABETH REID
Lead Articles Editor
Editorial Policy
The University of Richmond Law Review seeks to preserve the author's writing
style when editing articles selected for publication. Each author is given the opportu-
nity to review his or her article prior to its publication.
Furthermore, the Law Review strives to promote an open and close working rela-
tionship with authors of articles selected for publication. To this end, the Law Review
will maintain regular correspondence to update authors on the progress of their arti-
cles, as well as to resolve any problems that may occur during editing.
Submissions
The Law Review welcomes submissions year round on all legal topics. The Lead
Articles Editor reviews each submission. The Lead Articles Editor and the Editor-in-
Chief make offers of publication, taking into consideration quality and substance,
among other factors.
University of Richmond Law Review
University of Richmond, Virginia 23173
Phone: (804) 289-8216
Fax: (804) 287-6438
E-mail: lawreview@richmond.edu
Please visit our website at:
http:/lawreview.richmond.edu/
The University of Richmond Law Review (ISSN 0566-2389) (USPS 342-410) is pub-
lished four times a year by students of the University of Richmond Law School. Sub-
scription rate is $35.00 per year; single issues of The Annual Survey of Virginia Law
are available at $20.00 per copy; other single issues are available at $15.00 per copy.
Subscriptions are automatically renewed unless a written request for cancellation is
received prior to publication of the first issue of the volume. Periodical postage paid at
Richmond, Virginia, and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address
changes to the University of Richmond Law Review, 28 Westhampton Way, Univer-
sity of Richmond, Virginia 23173.
Copyright © 2016 by University of Richmond Law Review Association. Except as oth-
erwise provided, the author of each article in this issue has granted permission for
copies of that article to be made available for classroom use, provided that (1) the
copies are distributed at below cost, (2) the author and the University of Richmond
Law Review are identified, (3) proper notice of copyright is affixed to each copy, and
(4) the University of Richmond Law Review is notified of the use.
Back issues of Volumes 1 through 49 may be obtained from:
William S. Hein and Co., Inc., 2350 North Forest Road, Getzville, New York 14068.
OFFICERS OF INSTRUCTION AND ADMINISTRATION
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND
SCHOOL OF LAW
Administration
Ronald A. Crutcher, B.Mus., M.Mus., D.Mus ......... President of the University
of Richmond
Wendy C. Perdue, B.A., J.D .......................... Dean and Professor of Law
James Gibson, B.A., J.D ....... Associate Dean for Academics and Professor of Law
Corinna Barrett Lain, B.A., J.D .......... Associate Dean for Faculty Development
and Professor of Law
Kristine M. Henderson, B.A., J.D ........... Associate Dean for Student Services
and Administration
Roger V. Skalbeck, B.A., M.L.I.S., J.D ... Associate Dean, Library and Information
Services and Professor of Law
Janet D. Hutchinson, B.S., J.D ................. Associate Dean of Career Services
Michelle Rahman ................................ Associate Dean of Admissions
Faculty
Stephen Allred, B.A., M.P.A., J.D., Ed.D ..................... University Professor
Margaret Ivey Bacigal, B.A., J.D ........... Clinical Professor of Law and Director,
Clinical Placement Program
Ronald J. Bacigal, B.S., LL.B .................................. Professor of Law
W. Wade Berryhill, B.S., J.D., LL.M ................... Professor of Law, Emeritus
Carol N. Brown, A.B., LL.M., J.D .............................. Professor of Law
W. Hamilton Bryson, B.A., LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D., LL.D.. Blackstone Professor of Law
Tara L. Casey, B.A., J.D ............ Director, Carrico Center for Pro Bono Services
Dale Margolin Cecka, B.A., J.D ......................... Clinical Professor of Law
and Director of the Family Law Clinic
Henry L. Chambers, B.A., J.D ................................. Professor of Law
Christopher Corts, B.J., J.D., B.A., M.A ....... Assistant Professor of Legal Writing
Christopher A. Cotropia, B.S., J.D... Director of the Intellectual Property Institute
and Professor of Law
Ashley R. Dobbs, B.A., J.D ................. Assistant Clinical Professor of Law
John G. Douglass, B.A., J.D .................................. Professor of Law
Joel B. Eisen, B.S., J.D ........................................ Professor of Law
David G. Epstein, B.A., LL.M., LL.B ....................... Allen Professor of Law
Jessica M. Erickson, B.A., J.D ................................. Professor of Law
William 0. Fisher, A.B., J.D., M.P.P ............................ Professor of Law
David Frisch, B.S., J.D., LL.M ................................. Professor of Law
Chiara Giorgetti, Laurea in Giurisprudenza, M.Sc, LL.M., J.S.D ........ Associate
Professor of Law and
Faculty Director, LLM Program
Meredith Johnson Harbach, B.A., J.D ............... Associate Professor of Law
Mary L. Heen, B.A., M.A.T., J.D., LL.M ......................... Professor of Law
Azizah Y. al-Hibri, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D .............. Professor of Law, Emeritus
Ann C. Hodges, B.S., M.A., J.D ................................ Professor of Law
John P. Jones, B.A., J.D., LLM ....................... Professor of Law, Emeritus
Julie E. McConnell, B.A., J.D ................. Associate Clinical Professor of Law
and Director of the Children's Defense Clinic
Andre A. Moenssens, J.D., LL.M ...................... Professor of Law, Emeritus
Shari Motro, B.A., J.D ........................................ Professor of Law
Daniel T. Murphy, B.A., J.D., LL.M ................ Professor of Law, Emeritus
Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, J.D., M.S., B.S.E ..................... Professor of Law
John R. Pagan, A.B., M.Litt., J.D., D.Phil .................... University Professor
John F. Preis, B.S., J.D ....................................... Professor of Law
Emmeline Paulette Reeves, B.A., J.D ......... Director of Academic Skills Program
and Associate Professor of Law for Academic Success
Kimberly J. Robinson, B.A., J.D ................................ Professor of Law
Noah M. Sachs, B.A., J.D., M.P.A .......... Professor of Law and Faculty Director,
Merhige Center for Environmental Studies
Doron Samuel-Siegel, B.A., J.D ............. Assistant Professor of Legal Writing
Tamar R. Schwartz, B.A., J.D ................ Assistant Professor of Legal Writing
Andrew B. Spalding, B.A., J.D., Ph.D .................. Associate Professor of Law
Jonathan K. Stubbs, B.A., B.A., J.D., LL.M., M.T.S .............. Professor of Law
Rachel Juhas Suddarth, B.A., J.D ............ Assistant Professor of Legal Writing
Peter N. Swisher, B.A., M.A., J.D .............................. Professor of Law
Allison Anna Tait, B.A., J.D., PhD .................. Assistant Professor of Law
Mary Kelly Tate, B.A., J.D ................. Associate Clinical Professor of Law
and Director of the Richmond Institute for Actual Innocence
Carl W. Tobias, B.A., LL.B ........................... Williams Professor of Law
Adrienne E. Volenik, B.A., J.D .......................... Clinical Professor of Law
and Director, Education Rights Clinic
Margaret Ann B. Walker, B.A., J.D ................... Visiting Assistant Professor
for Academic Success
Kevin C. Walsh, A.B., M.A., J.D ................................ Professor of Law
Laura A. Webb, B.A., J.D .................... Assistant Professor of Legal Writing
W. Clark Williams, Jr., B.A., J.D ............................... Professor of Law
Library Faculty
Paul M. Birch, B.A., M.A.L.S., J.D ................ Computer Services Librarian
Alexis N. Fetzer, J.D., M.L.I.S ........ Reference and Research Services Librarian
Joyce Manna Janto, B.S., M.L.S., J.D ............................ Deputy Director
Kathleen Klepfer, J.D., M.L.I.S ....... Reference and Research Services Librarian
Mei Kiu Lo, B.S.S., M.L.S., C.A.S ................. Catalog and Systems Librarian
Amy L. O'Connor, B.A., M.L.S ....................... Digital Resources Librarian
Adjunct Faculty
Farhad Aghdami, B.A., J.D., LL.M .....................
Katherine B. Bain, B.A., J.D ...........................
Edward D. Barnes, B.A., J.D ...........................
W illiam Benos, LL.B., J.D .............................
Robert Best, B.A., J.D .................................
David Ernest Boelzner, B.A., M.A., J.D ..............
Genoveva I. Border J.D., LL.M .........................
Corey Booker, B.A., M .S., J.D ..........................
Claudia Brand, First Legal State Examination
(Germany), Second Legal State
Examination (Germany), J.D .......................
The Hon. Lynn S. Brice, B.A., M.S.W., J.D ..............
Craig M. Burshem, B.S., J.D ...........................
Jack W . Burtch, Jr., B.A., J.D .........................
Harris D. Butler, III, B.A., J.D .........................
Sean Byrne, B.A., J.D .................................
The Hon. Richard Campbell, B.A., J.D ..................
Brian Cannon, B.S., J.D ...............................
Latoya Asia Capers, B.S., J.D ..........................
Heather Caputo, B.A., J.D .............................
Claire G. Cardwell, B.A., J.D ..........................
Thomas Chaffe, B.A., J.D ..............................
Christopher Collins, B.A., J.D ..........................
Nancy D. Cook, B.S., J.D ..............................
Jam es C. Cosby, B.A., J.D .............................
Anne Marie Cushmac, J.D., LL.M ......................
Ashley T. Davis, B.A., J.D .............................
The Hon. Marla G. Decker, B.A., J.D ...................
Peter Duffey, B.A., J.D ................................
Jason Eakes, B.A., J.D ................................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
The Hon. Joseph J. Ellis, B.A., J.D ..................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Morna P. Ellis, B.A., M.Ed., J.D ....................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Andrea S. Erard, B.A., J.D ............................ Adjunct Professor of Law
Stephen Faraci, B.A., J.D .............................. Adjunct Professor of Law
Catherine French, B.A., J.D ........................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Lisa Frisina, B.B.A., J.D .............................. Adjunct Professor of Law
Michael Gill, B.A., J.D ................................ Adjunct Professor of Law
Paul G. Gill, B.A., J.D ................................. Adjunct Professor of Law
Michael L. Goodman, B.A., J.D ........................ Adjunct Professor of Law
Elizabeth Griffin, B.A., J.D ............................ Adjunct Professor of Law
Carolyn V. Grady, B.A., J.D ........................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Timothy H. Guare, B.A., J.D ........................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Elizabeth Wilson Hanes, B.A., J.D ..................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Michael N. Herring, B.A., J.D .......................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Vernon E. Inge, B.A., J.D .............................. Adjunct Professor of Law
John C. Ivins, Jr., B.A., J.D ........................... Adjunct Professor of Law
David J. Johnson, B.A., J.D ............................ Adjunct Professor of Law
The Hon. Randall G. Johnson, Jr., B.A., J.D ............. Adjunct Professor of Law
Phyllis C. Katz, B.A., MURP, J.D ...................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Elizabeth Laliberte, B.A., J.D .......................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Mary E. Langer, B.A., J.D ............................. Adjunct Professor of Law
Mary E. Maguire, B.A., J.D ............................ Adjunct Professor of Law
Bruce Matson, B.A., J.D ............................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Isaac McBeth, B.A., J.D ............................... Adjunct Professor of Law
James M. McCauley, B.A., J.D ......................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Kathleen M. McCauley, B.A., J.D ...................... Adjunct Professor of Law
James V. Meath, B.A., M.U.A., J.D ..................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Leigh Melton, B.A., J.D ............................... Adjunct Professor of Law
The Hon. Stephanie E. Merritt, B.A., J.D ............... Adjunct Professor of Law
Stephen Miller, B.A., J.D .............................. Adjunct Professor of Law
Traci B. Miller, B.A., J.D .............................. Adjunct Professor of Law
Duncan Minton, Jr., B.A., J.D ......................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Dale G. Mullen, B.A., B.S., J.D ........................ Adjunct Professor of Law
Jennifer Nesbitt, Jr., B.A., J.D ......................... Adjunct Professor of Law
The Hon. David J. Novak, B.S., J.D .................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Jay Oakey, A.B., J.D .................................. Adjunct Professor of Law
Nancy V. Oglesby, B.A., J.D ........................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Laurence V. Parker, Jr., B.A., M.B.A., J.D ............. Adjunct Professor of Law
Robert Partin, B.A., J.D ............................... Adjunct Professor of Law
The Hon. Jayne A. Pemberton, B.A., M.A., J.D ......... Adjunct Professor of Law
James Phillips, B.A., J.D., Ph.D ........................ Adjunct Professor of Law
Michael Pillow, B.A., J.D .............................. Adjunct Professor of Law
Brody Reid, B.A., J.D ................................. Adjunct Professor of Law
Jacqueline M. Reiner, B.A., J.D ........................ Adjunct Professor of Law
Elizabeth Riopelle, B.A., J.D ........................... Adjunct Professor of Law
John V. Robinson, B.A., B.L., J.D ...................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Thomas P. Rohman, B.B.A., J.D ........................ Adjunct Professor of Law
Stephen R. Romine, B.A., M.B.A., J.D ................ Adjunct Professor of Law
Marshall Ross, B.A., J.D .............................. Adjunct Professor of Law
Randy B. Rowlett, B.A., J.D ........................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Craig Sampson, B.A., J.D .............................. Adjunct Professor of Law
Connelia Ross Savage, B.S., J.D ........................ Adjunct Professor of Law
Cullen Seltzer, B.A., J.D .............................. Adjunct Professor of Law
Charles K. Seyfarth, B.A., J.D ......................... Adjunct Professor of Law
Blackwell Shelley, B.A., J.D ........................... Adjunct Professor of Law
The Hon. Beverly W. Snukals, B.A., J.D ................ Adjunct Professor of Law
John Steele, B.A., J.D ................................. Adjunct Professor of Law
John H. Thomas, B.A., J.D ............................ Adjunct Professor of Law
The Hon. Tracey W.J. Thorne-Begland, B.A., J.D ........ Adjunct Professor of Law
Ian D. Titley, B.S., J.D ................................ Adjunct Professor of Law
Samuel T. Towell, B.S., J.D ............................
John Tucker, B.A., J.D ................................
Robert J. W agner, B.A., J.D ...........................
M ichelle W elch, B.A., J.D ..............................
Thomas M . Wolfe, B.A., J.D ...........................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
Adjunct Professor of Law
LAW REVIEW ADVISORY BOARD
FAITH A. ALEJANDRO
PAMELA B. BECKNER
STEVEN D. BENJAMIN
J. EDWARD BETTS
M. DENISE MELTON CARL
JAMES B. COMEY
RICHARD CULLEN
JOHN P. CUNNINGHAM
ELIZABETH F. EDWARDS
JOHN D. Epps
DEBORAH LOVE FIELD
LAURA G. Fox
ScoTr J. GOLIGHTLY
PETER M. MELLETTE
PATRICK M. MCSWEENEY
BARRY T. MEEK
Louis A. MEZZULLO
WILLARD J. MOODY, SR.
JON A. MUELLER
CARL E. OMOHUNDRO, JR.
LAURENCE V. PARKER, JR.
J. WAVERLY PULLEY, III
MARGUERITE R. RUBY
C. RANDOLPH SULLIVAN
WILLIAM A. WALSH, JR.
PRESTON D. WIGNER
W. CLARK WILLIAMS, JR.
THOMAS S. WORD, JR.
